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
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T O T A L I T A R I A N I S M

in

GERMAN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Department of Philosophy


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Thesis

Arnold Guebert

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Introduction

When the first Great War ended the average person in the allied countries was quite sure that it was a victory for the liberal tradition. He felt with Woodrow Wilson that 'the world had been made safe for democracy.' And indeed, the crown did topple from the head of many a monarch, and representative governments were set up in countries where democracy was unknown before. It seemed but a matter of time until authoritarianism and absolutism would vanish from the earth. The tendency toward liberalism was thought to be inevitable.

Yet within a few brief years these fond hopes were dashed to the ground. Russia was a dictatorship even before the struggle came to an end. By 1924 Italy, Poland, Turkey, and a host of smaller countries had abandoned democracy or even the semblance of it. China's attempt to establish a republic along American lines failed utterly. In Japan the supreme power fell into the hands of a small military clique. And when in 1933 the German Republic passed out of existence and Hitler assumed absolute power in the Third Reich, liberals quite generally felt their cause had received a body blow.

There are many causes of these political upheavals in various parts of the world, which, however, cannot be discussed here. In this study the German situation claims our attention.

Many people of our day believe that the revolution in Germany and the rise of Hitlerism are the result of the mistakes of the Versailles Treaty. They are sure that if the statesmen at the peace conference had been wise enough to conclude a just and reasonable treaty Germany would have been able to get back on her feet in a few years and democratic institutions would have become so firmly established that dictatorship would not have gained a foothold. In other words they are of the opinion that all the trouble was due to temporary economic distress. It was hard times, they say, that almost forced the people to turn away from democracy and look to the dictator for a solution of their problems.

Other persons explain the situation on the basis of psychology. They think the establishment of Nazism was above all due to the magnetic personality of the 'Fuehrer'. By his showmanship, his fascinating oratory, and adroit use of propaganda Hitler was able to make the people believe he was the Moses who would lead them out of the wilderness. Thus he gained millions of fanatical followers and finally secured such unprecedented prestige and power, as has not been known since the days of the deified Roman emperors.

To the thoughtful student of politics, however, these explanations are too simple. While it is true that economic distress and the personality of the Fuehrer have played an important part in establishing National-Socialism on a permanent basis, it is equally

true that Hitler would not have succeeded in the measure that he did if the way had not been prepared by a political tradition and a political philosophy that long antedates his rise to power. This tradition and this philosophy have now quite universally been given the striking name of 'Totalitarianism'. Because the term is of recent origin people have thought, and many still think, that Hitler and his confrere Mussolini are creators of a new political philosophy. But this notion is entirely fallacious. All that these colorful dictators have done is to popularize an older ideology and to inspire millions of their countrymen to accept it with an enthusiasm on the borders on the fanatical.

Before we proceed to trace the philosophic roots of totalitarianism in German thought, however, it will be well to set forth clearly just what the word really means. The term is on the lips of nearly everyone today, but aside from the fact that it is something radically different from our democratic traditions most people have only a hazy idea of its implications.

In an interesting little brochure on the subject the philosopher R. B. Perry of Harvard states that "of all the catchwords of the day totalitarianism is the most difficult to define because as all such words its meaning is largely emotional and it has no history and no orthodoxy." He feels, therefore, that "the best that can be hoped for is to disentangle, define and trace certain

ideas which in their joint import on the contemporary mind have given a blurred meaning to the epithet." (The Roots of Totalitarianism, p. 20) We may agree that the term is difficult to define, but it is hardly true, that the term has no history and no orthodoxy. Perry himself really contradicts his opening statement when he proceeds to point out what the sources of totalitarianism are. Totalitarianism does have a history and a very long one at that.

Pitirim Sorokin in his monumental work "Social and Cultural Dynamics" defines totalitarianism from the viewpoint of the extensity of the social interactions of individuals. The sum total of all the activities and psychial experiences which make up the whole life process of a given person may be considered to be 100% or a circle. If all of these activities and experiences are conditioned by the interaction with another party or with a group, then the interaction may be said to be complete. No sector of the circle is exempt. "The person cannot do anything without influencing and being influenced by the interacting party. Interaction covers all the fields of his existence and experiences. The extensity of the interaction is complete, unlimited, universal,--totalitarian." (Ibid., p. 7.)

We might accept this definition as far as it goes; but since there is in real life no instance where the interaction is 100% it might be argued that real totalitarianism does not exist. Then,

too, it could be applied to any condition or relationship in the life of the individual. Thus Christianity, for example, or in fact any religion, which permeates the very being of a person, influencing his every action, may be said to be totalitarian. Even the case of a slave whose every activity is controlled by his master might be cited as an instance.

However, that is not the way the word is usually understood today. Everyone who uses the term refers to the relationship of the individual to the state and invariably thinks of Naziism, Fascism, and Communism. To apply the term to all kinds of relationships easily leads to confusion. In our present study, therefore, we shall always use the term in a restricted sense, referring to what might be more properly called state or national totalitarianism or 'etatism'.

Sorokin himself comes much nearer this commonly accepted meaning when he says that totalitarianism implies that "a given group and its government control and regulate all the behavior of its members, leaving nothing to their choice or to the regulation of other groups." (Ibid., p. 184.)

In this sense, then, totalitarianism refers to the doctrine that the state is supreme in all spheres of life. The individual's very existence is wrapped up in the state so that his life has meaning only in so far as and because he is a citizen. His loyalty to

the body politic has prior claim to any other; in fact, for him there can be nothing higher than the interests of the state. Under these circumstances it is idle to speak of the rights of the individual upon which the government could not infringe. There is no reserve in which he is protected against the encroachment of political officialdom.

In his book, "The Doctrine of Fascism," Mussolini presents this ideology in these words:

"The foundation of Fascism is the conception of the state, its character, its duty, and its aim. Fascism conceives of the state as an absolute, in comparison with which all individuals or groups are relative, only to be conceived of in their relation to the state.

"The state, as conceived of and as created by Fascism, is a spiritual and moral fact in itself, since its political, juridical, and economic organization of the nation is a concrete thing; and such an organization must be in its origin and development a manifestation of the spirit. The state is the guarantor of security both internal and external, as it has grown up through the centuries in language, in customs, and in faith."

(Quoted in Hill & State, Backgrounds of European Governments, p. 451-452.)

And Hitler repeatedly speaks of the "Hingabe des persoentlichen Daseins, des eigenen Lebens fuer die Gemeinschaft." That is to say, there must be a total surrender on the part of the individual. "All talents and capacities," the Nazi leader continues, "must be placed at the service of the community, and the ego subordinated, if need be, sacrificed to the welfare of the state." (Mein Kampf, p. 326

and 327.) The totalitarian creed is aptly summed up in a phrase of Mussolini, "All is in the state and for the state; nothing outside the state, nothing against the state."

It is obvious that this is the direct opposite of the liberal doctrine that political activity is only one aspect of human life, and that there are others equally important. A totalitarian considers such a conception rank heresy. To him "the state and its accompaniment, political activity, is the be-all and end-all of human existence. The state includes but transcends all lesser phases of human life, so that such things as economics, or philosophy, or art are only subordinate aspects of the attributes and functions of the state." (McGovern, From Luther to Hitler, p. 16.)

From this it will be seen that totalitarianism involves much more than a political doctrine or a theory of government. It implies a view of life, a 'Weltanschauung', as Germans are wont to call it. For that reason it is not synonymous with absolutism, though the two usually go together. Many a dictator, though claiming the right of life and death over his people, was not concerned about the thought and inner life of the subject as long as he obeyed orders. A despot like Frederick the Great could say: "In meinem Staat kann jeder nach seiner eigenen 'façon' selig werden." And even Louis XIV who supposedly boasted: "L'etat cest moi," acknowledged a higher authority than that of his own government. Totalitarianism cannot do

this and remain totalitarian. It contends that there is nothing greater or higher than the tribe or the 'Volk' or the state. Loyalty to the state is all-embracing. None other dare be placed over it or even along side it. Nationalism is raised to the status of a religion and thus even the things that are God's are given unto 'Caesar', for in every field, even in the field of morals and religion, the state speaks with the voice of God, it really is God.

In his "Church, Community, and State" Dr. Oldham admirably describes ~~the~~ totalitarian^{ism} state in these words:

"The totalitarian state is a state which lays claim to man in the totality of his being; which refuses to recognize the independence in their own sphere of religion, culture, education, and the family; which seeks to impose on all its citizens a particular philosophy of life; and which sets out to create by means of all the agencies of public information and education a particular type of man in accordance with its own understanding of the meaning and end of man's existence. A state which advances such claims declares itself to be not only a state but also a church."

(Quoted in "Christianity and World Order " by the Bishop of Chichester, p. 68.)

As already indicated, there is nothing really new in the doctrine of the all-competent, all-embracing state. As a matter of fact, it is as old as human history itself. Again and again down through the ages tribalism, folkism, or statism (there is no difference between these so far as the totalitarian element is concerned) have become so dominant as to rule out practically all individualism. In calling attention to this fact Sorokin lists the following

as belonging to the totalitarian type:

"Totalitarian were the state systems of ancient Egypt, especially in some periods like the Ptolemaic Egypt; the state system of ancient Peru, under the Incas; that of ancient Mexico; of ancient China, especially in the eleventh century; that of Japan under the Tokugawa shogunate; the state network of relationships of ancient Sparta, Lipara, and some other Greek states; of ancient Rome, especially after Diocletian; of ancient Byzantium; the state of the Taborites in Bohemia of the fifteenth century; several state systems of ancient India; then many short-lived state systems in revolutionary periods in the Islamic, the Persian Empire and in the European Middle Ages"

The author then adds the following comment:

"The situation was factually not very different in all the essentials (except the phraseology) from that in contemporary totalitarian state systems of Soviet Russia, Fascist Italy, or Nazi Germany The network was so closely woven that an individual could hardly take any step without touching the state system and bringing it into action."

(Social and Cultural Dynamics, Vol. III, p. 186-187.)

But not only has totalitarianism manifested itself in the objective, concrete development of states, of their governments, their administration of law, and their international relations,--but also in the sphere of political speculation, i.e. in the subjective development of ideas concerning the state as an abstraction. Already at the very beginning of the history of political thought, i.e. at the time of the ancient Greeks, we find the idea stressed that politics embraces all human activity. Plato himself (though it should not be forgotten that his interest is primarily ethical and idealistic) gives us one of the most brilliant expositions of the theory

that the community or society should completely dominate the life of the private citizen. And for classical Greek thinkers in general "man and the state were bound together in a living social whole; neither could have interests contrary to the other. The state was conceived to be a living personality, absorbing in its life all individual personalities; and political existence was considered to be the highest form of life." (Gettell, History of Political Thought, p. 39.)

These and similar ideas were reiterated somewhat later in the days of the Roman Empire and also throughout the Middle Ages. In fact, the Roman Catholic Church was in essence totalitarian, for it took over from the Roman Empire the theory of absolute and universal jurisdiction over the affairs of man and its head claimed to be the sole source of legitimate power on earth. At the dawn of the modern era we find Machiavelli (1469-1527) stressing the importance of the state and claiming there was no law binding upon it, that it was a law unto itself. A hundred years later Hobbes expounded his theory of the "great Leviathan" in which there is absolute unity and unquestioned obedience, all human associations being mere "worms in the entrails of Leviathan." And even that arch-radical of the eighteenth century, Jean J. Rousseau, could not conceive of the state except in terms of totalitarianism, of a "total surrender."

We cannot here trace the long and distinguished genealogy of

the totalitarian tradition in the writings of the various political philosophers. But a word should be said about Rousseau; for it was he that exerted the greatest influence upon the development of political thought in Germany.

Rousseau, like Hobbes and Locke before him, started out with the idea of a pre-political state of nature. Due to economic inequality, he says, it became necessary to establish civil society. This was accomplished by a social contract, for only by agreement and consent could authority be justified and liberty be retained, since "man is born free." Each individual in entering the contract gives up his natural rights to the community as a whole. In this way a body politic with a life and will of its own is formed. Yet the individual does not lose his freedom by joining the state. His will is merged into the general will of the whole. And since this 'general will' "merely by what it is, is always right" it is invariably the 'real will' of the individual. For that reason a person who is compelled by the whole body to obey the general will is really "forced to be free." (Social Contract, p. 16 ff.)

This idea of will as the ultimate element in politics was developed by the German idealists of the latter part of the eighteenth and the early part of the nineteenth century into a glorification of the national state along totalitarian lines. And later thinkers based their theories to a large extent on the earlier idealists.

In this brief study it will not be possible to deal with all the German thinkers who might come into consideration. We have therefore limited ourselves to those who are most representative of totalitarian thought and who at the same time exercised the greatest influence upon later generations,--namely Fichte, Hegel, Treitschke, and Nietzsche. These, we believe, are the real spiritual forbears of the German ideologists of our day. Of the four, Fichte and Hegel are undoubtedly the most important and will therefore receive the most consideration.

Johann Gottlieb Fichte
(1762 - 1814)

Fichte is without doubt one of the most contentious figures in the history of German political philosophy. Thinkers of the most divergent views quote him in support of their theories. "It is amusing," says Helmuth Johnsen, "to see how Fichte is pronounced now a democrat, and then a socialist. One group extols him as a cosmopolite, another as the most ardent patriot. On the one hand he is proclaimed a pacifist, praising with Kant eternal peace; on the other he is a nationalist, pronouncing with Machiavelli that war is an ethical duty. One group invokes him as spokesman for the League of Nations, the other sees in him a prophet of the German national state of the future." (Das Staatsideal J. G. Fichtes, p. 7. Quoted in Engelbrecht's Johann Gottlieb Fichte, p. 9.)

The reason for this divergence of opinion is that all these elements are actually to be found in Fichte's writings; for we find a decided development in his political thought. In his earlier years, during the revolutionary era, he is an outspoken revolutionist, and very hostile to the state. His pamphlets, "Zurueckforderung der Denkfreiheit" and "Beitraege zur Berichtigung der Urtheile" are a ringing appeal for the freedom of the individual and a protest against the concentration of power in the hands of the ruler. The state is something against which we must be on our guard. Some one has called this the 'night watchman theory' of the state. Little wonder, then, that Fichte was accused of Jacobism.

Somewhat later, however, we note a great change. Fichte now considers the state a friend. It is the means through which the ideals of man can be achieved, and without which he cannot attain his true end. It grants the individual everything which he ought to possess for his own best interests and for the community as a whole. Thus Fichte, particularly in his later years, became an extreme nationalist. The German nation assumes such proportions in his thought that he must be classed with the thorough-going totalitarians.

To understand Fichte it will be necessary that we outline at least briefly his fundamental philosophy. Fichte started out as a Spinozian determinist, but about 1790 he read Kant and from that

time on he was a disciple of the great Koenigsberg thinker. It was Kant's doctrine of freedom particularly that appealed to Fichte. The "Critique of Pure Reason" opened up the way to the philosophic acceptance of free spirit. That is just what Fichte wanted. The determinism and fatalism of Spinoza had never satisfied him.

However, Fichte did not accept Kantianism en toto. He objected especially to Kant's dualism. Like Spinoza he felt that all human experience and activity, all science and all knowledge^{should} be reduced to a "fundamental principle which shall be one, self-evident, absolute, exhaustive, all-comprehending, and all-explaining."

(Fuller, History of Philosophy, p. 369.) In fact, Fichte believed the real goal of philosophy was to find that principle. He, therefore, discards Kant's objective, supersensual 'think-in-itself' and considers the Good, active Reason, pure Will, Free Spirit as the true Reality. This all-embracing principle Fichte calls the 'Moral Ego'. The Moral Ego produces "its own experience out of itself, and progressively organizes its experience in accordance with necessities imposed by its essentially moral and purposive nature."

(Fuller, 369.) This conception, Fichte feels, is the only one that can explain consciousness, and is therefore a necessary postulate of all thinking and of all existing. "The moral will," he says, "is the only reality."

However, this postulation of its own existence implies that

there must be something that is not the 'ego', in other words a 'non-ego' must be assumed. The postulate 'I think' implies that there is something I have thought about which is other than myself. The subject must have an object; hence there must be an outer world. Free spirit thus sets up this outer world without which there would be no field of moral endeavor. Treitschke explains this point in these words:

"Because the purpose of our spirit can be realized only in practical action, and practical action requires a stage, therefore, and only for this reason, spirit is forced to project an outer world out of itself (aus sich herauszuschauen) and consider it a real world."

(Treitschke, Auserwaehlte Schriften, p. 246.)

The outer world is, so to say, the limit which the Ego sets itself in order to overcome it. In this way it realizes itself; and that is true freedom, for true freedom consists in this that the ego creates itself and realizes itself.

However, the non-ego, the external world, in turn consists of a multitude of egos, which are personalities apart from mine. Ultimately, of course, all these egos are manifestations of the Absolute Ego, which thinks itself, is both subject and object. True freedom is not, therefore, realized in the individual, the empirical ego, but in society. In society man makes the laws which govern his conduct. He obeys these laws, not because he is forced to do so by some power outside himself but because they are the laws of

his own being, his own essentially moral nature. The state, as society organized, is then an expression of moral freedom.

And that leads to the proper concept of duty, which is another of Fichte's fundamental principles. In contrast with Kant he gives this idea a social turn. Only as man understands his duty in society can society come into being and fulfill its purpose which is the achievement of freedom. And only when the individual thus fulfills his duty in human society can he speak of real freedom. Fichte, therefore, discards Rousseau's idea of natural freedom or freedom in a state of nature. Freedom is possible only through the law of the state. The law of the state does not, therefore, limit a person's freedom, or take it away, it guarantees it; in fact, that is the whole purpose of the state.

It will be seen from this that while Fichte started with the emphasis on freedom he ended up with the emphasis on authority and the supreme importance of the national state. To this was added a mystic belief in the divine mission of the German people as the best and most enlightened of them all. Thus Fichte came to champion an extreme type of national egotism and what amounts to a deification of his own people. Gentz says of him: "So grosz und tief und stolz hat fast noch niemand von der deutschen Nation gesprochen." (Quoted in Treitschke, p. 264.) This glorification of his own people is carried to such lengths that the German nation is identified with

everything that is good, and the foreign countries with everything that is bad.

Since we are dealing only with Fichte's totalitarianism we may very well leave aside his earlier theory and dwell chiefly on his later nationalist and socialist concepts of the state.

Before we do this, however, it may be well to remark that unlike Hegel Fichte distinguishes between the people or the nation (das Volk) and the state. The 'Volk' comes first. The state is the means through which the 'Volk' realizes its aspirations and fulfills its mission. However, this distinction is not of great importance practically. The state is really the people organized, and a people that is not organized will hardly accomplish very much. In other words while a 'Volk' may exist without the state it certainly will not be a very vital one. Treitschke points out that Fichte himself saw this and finally came to the realization that the state was the 'embodiment of nationality'. (Verkoerperung des Volkstums.) (Ibid., p. 268.) Thus the distinction is one without a real difference.

Fichte's totalitarianism becomes evident already in his "Grundzuege des gegenwaertigen Zeitalters," which appeared as early as 1804. There the place of man in society comes up for discussion and Fichte contends that man must not be considered as an individual,

but only as a unit within the whole.. He tells us that "it is the greatest error and the real basis for all other errors which are befuddling this age, when an individual imagines that he can exist, live, think, and act for himself, and when he believes that he himself, his own person, is the object of his thought, since he is but a single unit in the general and necessary thought." (Werke, VII, p. 37 and 38.) And in the following lecture we are told

"Whoever thinks of himself as a person, and desires a life and an existence, and any kind of enjoyment of self outside the group (Gattung) and for the group, he is indeed a mean, small, and at the same time miserable person, no matter how well he may conceal his deformity with all kinds of good works." (Ibid., p. 35.)

'Gattung' is variously described as the 'opposite of individuality, the One, the Organic Whole, the thing that alone exists, the idea.' Hence Fichte claims that the individual as such really has no existence.

"Looking at the think as it is in truth we find that the individual does not exist; that he cannot count for anything, but must disappear completely; and the group alone exists and it alone must be considered as existent." (Ibid., p. 37-38.)

A little later this argument is strengthened by basing it upon ethical and religious grounds:

"Reasonable life consists in this that the individual forgets himself in the group, ties his life to the life of all and sacrifices himself for the whole; unreasonable life is that that the individual thinks of nothing but himself, loves nothing but himself and in relation to himself, and seeks nothing but his own well-being. And if that which is reasonable is evil, then there is but one virtue; to forget oneself as an in-

dividual; and only one vice; to think of oneself." (Werke, VII, 35.)

"Nothing individual can live in itself and for itself, but everything lives in the whole." (Ibid., 63.)

This is totalitarianism pure and simple. Such doctrine invariably leads to extreme nationalism and a glorification of one's own group or nation. That this is true we see from the "Patriotic Dialogues" which appeared in the years 1806 and 1807. The dialog is carried on between A and B, in which B sets forth the views of Fichte, while A represents a patriotic Prussian. After a lengthy discussion on 'patriotism' and 'cosmopolitanism' B finally explains the relation between the two by saying:

"Cosmopolitanism is the will that the purpose of life and of many be attained in all mankind. Patriotism is the will that this purpose be attained first of all in that nation of which we are members, and the wish that this light may radiate from this nation over all mankind." (Nachg. Werke, Vol. III, p. 228 ff.)

That is to say cosmopolitanism and real patriotism are identical, for both are aiming at the same thing, namely to attain the purpose of mankind (Zweck des Daseins des Menschengeschlechts). Local patriotism, therefore, or 'Schoßlen-patriotismus' is to be discouraged and all, also the loyal Prussian, are to seek a unified monarchy and the development of a national character. B finally sums up the whole matter in these words:

"Let us summarize. The patriot wishes that the purpose of mankind be reached first of all in that nation of which he is

a member. In our day this purpose can only be furthered by philosophy (Wissenschaft). Therefore philosophy and its widest possible dissemination in our day must be the immediate purpose of mankind, and no other purpose can or should be fixed for it." (Nachg. Werke, Vol. III, p. 233.)

And now we are told what part the German must play in achieving this great purpose of mankind. He has a special duty in this respect for he alone is properly qualified to carry out this mission since science and philosophy have originated among the Germans and only a German can rightly understand 'Wissenschaft'.

"The German patriot wishes that this purpose be attained first of all among the Germans and that from them it spread to the rest of mankind. The German can desire this, for in his midst philosophy has had its origin and it is developed in his language. It may be assumed that in that nation which has had the wisdom to conceive philosophy there should also rest the ability to understand it. Only the German can desire this, for only he, through the possession of philosophy and the possibility given thereby to understand it, can comprehend that this is the immediate purpose of mankind. This purpose is the only possible patriotic goal. Only the German can, in the interest of his nation include all mankind. Since the instinct of Reason has become extinct and the era of Egotism has begun, every other nation's patriotism is selfish, narrow, hostile to the rest of mankind." (Italics our own.) (Ibid., 234.)

B then proceeds to outline the principles of true philosophy. He informs A that the state must not be looked upon as an ordinary human devise which just happened to develop as time went on. Nor is it due to a special act of God. From the standpoint of philosophy it is to be viewed as a product of Reason, and government is an art derived from Reason. When A. objects that all this is very difficult to understand and beyond the comprehension of about 99 per

cent of the people B insists that they can be taught if only the right method of education is used. And he finally winds up by declaring that unless the German people realize their responsibility and "take over the government of the world through philosophy" the whole culture of the present day will utterly disappear.

However, it is particularly in the "Reden an die Deutsche Nation" that the totalitarianism of Fichte comes to the fore. There has been some argument as to whether the 'Reden' give us the real Fichte, yet there can be hardly any doubt about it. Even a man like Treitschke says they are his "noblest work", for they have "that one great advantage, that in them a man, unique and priceless, has portrayed his inmost being." (Auserwählte Schriften, p. 260.) Certain it is that these "Addresses" are the one book invariably connected with Fichte's name and that they have exerted a profound influence upon the German people. Not without reason does Fichte's own son insist that the 'Reden' have been "the political book of devotion of the Germans."

What strikes one in reading this work is Fichte's boundless enthusiasm for all things German. The German people emerge as the purest, the most homogeneous, the most vital of all nations. The 'Reden' are, as Fuller says, a grand peroration on the theme "Deutschland ueber alles."

Fichte begins by emphasizing the uniqueness of the Germans which is due to language. A language, he tells us, is not something accidental (etwas Willkuerliches), not dependent "on arbitrary decisions and agreements." (Werke, VII, p. 314.) It is developed according to a fundamental law, and so it is not really man that speaks, but human nature within him, which thus announces itself to others of his kind. Hence one should say: "Language is unique and unavoidably necessary." (Ibid., p. 315.) It is the expression of the soul of a people and therefore something living and vital.

"Since language is not an arbitrary means of communication, but breaks forth out of the life of understanding as an immediate force of nature, a language continuously developed according to this law has also the power of immediately affecting and stimulating life. . . . The words of such a language in all its parts are life and create life." (Ibid., p. 318.)

But Fichte does not mean to give the impression that all languages belong in this class. Such a vital and vitalizing language only the Germans possess. That distinguishes them not only from other peoples and races but also from other Teutonic tribes. He says:

"The difference arose at the moment of the separation of the common stock and consists in this, that the German speaks a language which has been alive ever since it first issued from the force of nature, whereas the other Teutonic races speak a language which has movement on the surface only but is dead at the root." (Ibid., p. 325.)

For this reason the Germans can understand the foreigner, and that even better than the foreigner understands himself, but a

foreigner can never understand the German.

However, there are other and more vital consequences of this superiority of language. At the end of the fourth address, Fichte sums these up under four heads:

- "1) Where the people has a living language, mental culture influences life; where the contrary is the case, mental culture and life go their way independently of each other.
- "2) For the same reason, a people of the former kind is really and truly in earnest about all mental culture and wishes it to influence ~~rather~~ life; whereas a people of the latter kind looks upon mental culture rather as an ingenious game and has no wish to make it anything more.
- "3) From No. 2 it follows that the former has honest diligence and earnestness in all things, and takes pains; whereas the latter is easygoing and guided by its happy nature.
- "4) From all this together it follows that in a nation of the former kind the mass of the people is capable of education, and the educators of such a nation test their discoveries on the people and wish to influence it; whereas in a nation of the latter kind the educated classes separate themselves from the people and regard it as nothing more than a blind instrument of their plans." (Ibid. p. 327.)

What Fichte evidently means to say is that where there is an original language the 'Geistesbildung', the mental culture, affects and really takes hold of the life of the people. Such a people takes life more seriously and gives evidence of a diligence and an earnestness entirely lacking in other countries which have no original language. Only Germans are, therefore, capable of real culture. And what this culture is Fichte explains in the following address:

"When we speak here of life and of the influence exerted upon it by mental culture, we must be understood to mean original life (das urspruengliche Leben) in its flow from the source of all spiritual life, from God, and development of human relationship according to their archetype, and, therefore, the creation of a new life, such as has never hitherto existed." (Ibid., p. 329.)

In this 'Geistesbildung', Fichte says later, philosophy plays the chief role, for through it man is brought nigh to the image of God. All this is possible with the Germans; other peoples, poor souls, will have to get along without this, for they have no original language. They are, in consequence of this, also lacking in the proper earnestness and diligence. They have 'Geist', mind or spirit, but not that untranslatable thing called 'Gemuet'. Hence their masses cannot be educated. In this respect the Germans have the advantage. They are possessed of that depth of feeling and that serious application to duty which enables them to accept responsibility and be sincere about their mission.

According to Fichte, history also bears out his contention, particularly the history of the Reformation. Why did this great religious movement take place in Germany? Because of the impact of religion on that 'German man Luther'. He became the Reformer not because of any special enlightenment from God but because he was a German, a man with 'Gemuet'. And that the German people accepted Luther's gospel and could be aroused and enthused to a desire for the salvation of the soul is another proof of this unique

and "fundamental characteristic of the Germans". (Grundzug der Deutschen.)

Their depth and seriousness also enable the Germans to think freely and independently, i.e. philosophically. They can search for the supersensate (das Uebersinnliche) in human reason and so create true philosophy. Thus true philosophy is German philosophy. Foreigners are too frivolous and too shallow to be capable of real philosophic thought.

That Fichte is guilty of a mystical glorification of his own people is all too evident. A despicable ^{res} ~~mega~~mania can be the only of such teachings.

In a later address, the seventh, these ideas are applied to politics. The real nature of the state and of government can be understood only through philosophy. And since only Germans know what real philosophy is, only Germans can adequately understand the state. Foreigners always look upon the state as a huge machine which forces the individual to fit in or grinds him to pieces. Life in society is thus reduced to mechanic and artificial action. (Kuentliches Druck-und Raederwerk.) Among Germans we don't find this. Says Fichte:

"Altogether different is genuine German statecraft. (Staatskunst.) It, too seeks fixity, surety, and independence of blind and halting nature, and in this it is quite in agreement with foreign countries. But, unlike these, it does not seek a fixed and certain thing, as the first element, which

will confirm the spirit as the second element; on the contrary, it seeks from the very beginning, and as the very first and only element, a firm and sure spirit. This is for German statecraft the ever driving urge which has life in itself and which regulates and continues to keep in motion the life of society." (Ibid., p. 366.)

Thus 'spirit', 'Geist' is the main thing, and hence it follows that the state has a much higher duty than merely to protect its citizens and secure their earthly well-being. Its chief task, yes one might say almost its only task is education. Also in his "Fragments" Fichte stresses this point, "above all the most general and the most enduring purpose is education of the people unto a recognition of justice or the right," "education unto a recognition of the moral purpose." (Werke, VII, p. 576 and 574.) The state must create its own citizens as the Greeks did. It must arouse in them an understanding of the true nature and the true aim of the state so that they will freely accept its ordinances and willingly submit to its laws and regulations. Thus education, if it is the right kind, will result in a 'complete' remaking of mankind' (eine gaenzliche Umschaffung des Menschgeschlechts). All this will be accomplished, says Fichte, when the individual is led away from the world of sense (die Sinnenwelt) to the world of spirit (die Welt des Geistes). And what this implies we see from the following:

"That spirit which is to be produced implies the higher

love of fatherland, the conception of its earthly life as eternal and of the fatherland as the support of that eternity. If it is produced in the Germans, it will include love of the German fatherland as one of its essential elements, and from that love there spring of themselves the courageous defender of his country and the peaceful and honest citizen. Such an education, indeed, achieves even more than that immediate object; the whole man is inwardly perfected and completed in every part, and outwardly equipped with perfect fitness for all his purposes in time and eternity. With our recovery as a nation ~~the~~ fatherland the spiritual nature has inseparably connected our complete cure from all the evils that oppress us." (Ibid., p. 400-401.)

According to Fichte, then, man must be completely made over by the state. But in order to achieve this goal the old traditional form of education must be abandoned. An altogether new type is necessary, and the kind that measures up to requirements is that of Pestalozzi; for Pestalozzi seeks to train not only the mind but the whole man.

It is almost self-evident that this new education, which is not only a national education but also an education unto nationalism, must be entirely under the control of the state. It cannot be left to the church as heretofore; for the church neglects the national interests since it focusses its attention on the after-life, a heaven above this earth. And whoever looks to such a heaven, says Fichte, has no true fatherland here below. (Werke, VII, p. 383.) Likewise education cannot be left to the parents or the home. Such training would be too haphazard and desultory. It also could not be general. Education is, therefore, essentially the business of

the state.

To the objection that there may be some who cannot be brought into line even by this better type of education, Fichte has an answer. He says in that case the state must use force, for the individual does not live unto himself, as already pointed out. He is like a member of the body, a unit within the whole, and as such he must play his part. If he has not learned this of himself he must be forced to do so for the state is also 'Zwangsstaat', the compelling state. As such its power is absolute and anyone who refused to obey must be coerced.

In doing this the state is completely justified. Because of its higher purpose it has the 'rights of majesty' (Majestaetsrecht) and may, like a God, not only compel, but even risk the lower life to save the higher. (II. Address, Ibid., p. 429.) And what is more, to force the individual to follow justice is to force him to obey his own enlightened will and be truly free. "Den Rechtsge-setze unterworfen sein, heiszt: unterworfen sein der eigenen Ein-sicht." (Ibid., p. 574.) This means that moral obligation and freedom are the same thing. A little further on Fichte insists that "he should be absolute lord (Zwingherr) who in his time and among his people stands at the very top. Everyone must admit that in obeying this lord he is really obeying himself." (Ibid., p. 576.) And then he adds this very significant statement: "Here we

demand the all-embracing unity of the state per se, and the absorption (das Aufgehen) of all in the state. Since I am one of those who have helped along in this, I ought to know what is meant." (Ibid., p. 576.)

It is not difficult to see what an application of these ideas leads to in practical life. The individual has just so much freedom as the government allows him. He cannot lay claim to any inalienable rights. The state not only controls his entire education but its officials also decide at all times what is just and right. The only course for the average citizen is unquestioning obedience. Thus Fichte's freedom, in the last analysis, is the kind of freedom Hitler is always promising his people. They may do anything they wish as long as it is in accordance with his will.

In justice to Fichte it should be added that he was sure force would be necessary in the case of only a very few. Once the new education was introduced the great majority would be animated by 'Geist' and would "rise to a free intelligence and willing obedience under general law." (Fragments, Werke VII, p. 575.) They would come to understand that "unlimited independence" consists "in the recognition of one's own limitations which are consciously established by one's own will." (Ibid., p. 535.)

Of course all this again is possible only with Germans, for they, and they only, are the genuine and the original folk, 'Das

Urvolk', 'das Volk schlechtweg'. (Reden, Werke VII, p. 374.) As the 'Urvolk' they alone can be taught and can understand what really constitutes a people.

"It must be obvious at once that only the Germans--the original man, who has not become dead in an arbitrary organization--really has a people, and is entitled to count on one." (Ibid., p. 378.)

However, there is another consideration if all these fond hopes are to be realized, says Fichte. Germany will never assume her rightful place if she is not secure politically; therefore Germans must look to their borders. And the real borders of the nation are not those arbitrary geographical lines but the inner borders, those of language and culture.

"The first, original, and truly natural boundaries of States are beyond doubt their internal boundaries. Those who speak the same language are joined to each other by a multitude of invisible bonds by nature herself, long before any human art begins; they understand each other and can continue to make themselves understood more and more clearly; they belong together and are by nature one and an inseparable totality!" (Ibid., p. 460.)

This is the same thought expressed by the poet Ernst Moritz Arndt in the well known lines;

"Was ist des Deutschen Vaterland?
So nenne endlich mir das Land!
Soweit die deutsche Zunge klingt
Und Gott im Himmel Lieder singt,
Das soll es sein!
Das, wackrer Deutscher, nenne dein!"

According to this Germans belong to Germany wherever they are, and,

by implication, the territory they inhabit should also be a part of the Reich.

Because Germans just naturally belong together, they should never attempt to absorb a 'Volk' of another race or language. That can never be of benefit. A people true to its nature may conquer a neighboring territory but it must drive out the foreign race or make them slaves; otherwise it will lose the characteristic of the 'Volk schlechtweg' and work towards its own disintegration.

This of course smacks of Nazi racialism, though Fichte stressed language rather than bodily structure and blood. He felt that if people spoke German and considered German their mother tongue they should be looked upon as members of the German national state. And yet Fichte made one important exception. The Jews, he declared, could never really be German. Even if a Jew spoke the language there was always something obnoxious about him. Fichte claimed he had never found a Jew who had any sense of justice, humanity, or truth. Therefore, the only thing to do with this degenerate people was to deport them outright or to make life so miserable for them as to force them to leave of their own accord. In view of modern development this anti-Semitism of Fichte is certainly significant. (Beitraege, p. 149 ff.)

Closely allied with the foregoing is his economic nationalism.

The state must be "closed commercially", says Fichte. This idea he had developed already in an earlier work, entitled "Der geschlossene Handelstaat" where his economic doctrine is set forth at some length.

Following Rousseau Fichte says that man gets his place in life and his sphere of activity by an economic contract, and that the state's duty is to secure the enforcement of the contract. But note what part the state plays in the economic field. It divides all workers into three classes: producers, artisans, and merchants. The individual hasn't very much to say about this, particularly after he has once been classified. He just has to stay put or the whole scheme will break down.

The difficult problem of finance is summarially dealt with by the government. Fichte would have the state fix the value of all things and their price on the market but not in terms of silver and gold but on the basis of a bushel of grain. To that end the state creates a purely national money (Landgeld) which is used by the people within the state. A World money (Weltgeld) would also be necessary, but this would not be in circulation and would be completely controlled by the state.

But to make the whole scheme work a third operation is required, namely the isolation of the state commercially from the rest of the world. In this way the German people might become wholly indepen-

dent of foreign commerce and economically selfsufficient. Fichte believed that Germany contained within her own boundaries everything needed to maintain a proper standard of living. If the economic resources were properly developed there would be no need to trade with the outside world and the greatest happiness for the people would ensue. They could live in peace and security, little disturbed by excessive taxation, crime waves, and wars. What is more, the people would be more firmly attached to their fatherland, a real national character would be developed and a high sense of national honor engendered in the hearts of the masses.

Undoubtedly the ideas and methods which were prevalent at that time affected Fichte's thought, as Engelbrecht points out; but who will say that he was not influenced also by Plato who held similar views with regard to the state's duty in the economic field? Lassalle writing about thirty years later was speaking in the Fichtean vein when he said: "We must widen our notion of the state so as to believe that the state is the institution in which the whole virtue of humanity should be realized." (Theory of the State, cited in Engelbrecht, p. 82.) Fichte, like all totalitarians, is bent upon the complete nationalization of all economic activity with a view toward ultimate selfsufficiency of the national state. And so we see that also Hitlerian 'autarchy' is not a product of the twentieth century.

However, Fichte's totalitarianism stands out still more clearly when we examine his teachings concerning patriotism and religion and the relationship between the two.

Since only the Germans are a real 'Volk' they alone know what patriotism is. Other peoples may speak about it but they never have and never can experience true love for the nation. "Only the German is capable of real and rational love for his nation." (Werke, VII, p. 378.)

It was this spirit that animated the old Germanic tribes when they were threatened by the Romans, says Fichte. Without being aware of it they were fighting in the front ranks of civilization. If the Romans had subjugated the Germans the development of mankind would have taken a different, and a not too happy turn. Not only the Germans, therefore, are indebted to the old Teutons for all they are and have, but the whole modern world owes its very existence to their spirit and love for the nation.

A similar love must animate Germans today, and that both people and government. In fact, patriotism must rule the state. Fichte answers the question: "What spirit is it that may place itself at the helm of the state?" with these words:

"Not the spirit of the peaceful citizen's love for the constitution and the laws, but the devouring flame of higher patriotism, which embraces the nation as the vesture of the eternal, for which the noble-minded man joyfully sacrifices himself, and the ignoble man, who only exists for the sake of

other, must sacrifice himself." (*Italics our own*) (Ibid., p. 487.)

What Fichte demands is not the common garden variety of patriotism but a patriotism of a higher type, one which "embraces the nation as the vesture of the eternal." The true German looks upon his nation as divine. He views it "in the image of eternity." (Unter dem Bilde der Ewigkeit, und zwar der sichbaren und versinnlichten Ewigkeit.) (Ibid., p. 383.) His attitude toward the fatherland is therefore one of awe and reverence.

Thus we see that Fichte's patriotism breathes a religious spirit. Indeed, if the question is asked: What is the relation between patriotism and religion the answer must be, that for Fichte there is no real difference. His 'Vaterlandsliebe' is his religion. The nation is not only divine it is also the organ through which the eternal spirit reveals itself and which makes possible the fulfillment of the highest ideals and aspirations of man.

Fichte's argument runs something like this. True religion does not consist above all in a looking forward to and seeking after the bliss of eternal life in the hereafter or in the obedience and submission to the will of God. That was the case with the apostles and the first Christians, but that was the exception. The natural condition and the rule of the universe is that man seeks his heaven here upon earth, that he longs to have some of the eternal flow into his every day life here and now. He wants to trans-

plant the immutable into the temporal, and that in such a way that mortal eye can see it. Every noble-minded person desires to live on in his children and children's children, and thus have his life, renewed and enobled, continue long after he has passed from the scene. (Ibid., 379-380.) In other words Fichte discards a 'Jenseits - Religion' for a 'Diesseits-Religion.' He says:

"That man of noble mind (Edeldenkender) is there who does not want to scatter, by action or thought, a grain or seed for the unending progress in perfection of his peace, to fling something new and unprecedented into time, that it may remain there and become the inexhaustible source of new creations? Does he not wish to pay for his place on this earth and the short span of time allotted to him with something that even here below will endure forever, so that he, the individual, although unnamed in history (for the thirst for posthumous fame is contemptible vanity), may yet in his own consciousness and his own faith leave behind him unmistakable memories that he, too, has existed on the earth." (Ibid., p. 380.)

According to the thoughts and the needs of these 'Edeldenkenden', a kind of spiritual nobility, the world is to be arranged, for on their account the world still continues to exist. Others are there merely for their sake and must submit to them.

And now Fichte tells us, that the only basis of the hope and faith of the noble-minded is the existence of the nation. His only guarantee that he will live on after his death is an order of things which he considers eternal in itself and also capable of taking up into itself the eternal. This 'order' is explained in the following very significant paragraphs:

"Such an order of things, however, is the special spiritual

nature of human environment which, although incomprehensible (note the mysticism, A.G.) nevertheless exists, and from which he himself, with all his thoughts and deeds and with his belief in their eternity, has proceeded--the people, from which he is descended and among which he formed and grew up to be what he now is." (Ibid., p. 381.)

This same idea is further expressed in these words:

"The noble-minded man's belief in the eternal continuance of his influence even on this earth is thus founded on the hope of the eternal continuance of the people from which he has developed, and on the characteristic of that people as indicated in the hidden law of which we have spoken, without admixture of, or corruption by, any alien element which does not belong to the totality of the functions of that law. This characteristic is the eternal thing to which he entrusts the eternity of himself and of his continuing influence, the eternal order of things in which he places his portion of eternity, he must will its continuance, for it alone is to him the means by which the short span of his life here below is extended into continuous life here below." (Ibid., p. 382.)

According to this man is not only the creation of his environment and the product of his nation but his very life, all his hopes for time and eternity, are wrapped up in the existence of the 'Volk'. This is further expressed in Fichte's definition of a people:

"Das ganze der in Gesellschaft mit einander fortlebenden und sich aus sich selbst immerfort natuerlich und geistig erzeugenden Menschen, das insgesamt unter einem gewissen besonderen Gesetze der Entwicklung des Goettlichen aus ihm steht." (Ibid., p. 381.)

That is to say, a people is not a group of individuals who happen to be living together under one governmental roof, but above all a totality of human beings who reproduce themselves bodily and spiritually, and who are subject to a certain special law of the development of the godly out of itself. According to this law all

future revelations of the divine will appear and take shape in the people. (l.c.) This law also produces the national character.

"That law determines entirely and completes what has been called the national character of a people, that law of the development of the original and divine." If the individual citizen thus regards his nation, the godly will appear in him also and he can rejoice in the fact that he is God's vessel and that through him the Divine flows into the world. Having come to this realization he will not only serve the fatherland but be ready to give his life for it.

"Um die Nation zu retten, muss er sogar sterben wollen, damit diese lebe, und er in ihr lebe das einzige Leben, das er von je gemocht hat." (Ibid., 383.) In fact, it is only because he regards the nation as divine and as the guarantee of his own eternal life that he can be brought to sacrifice himself for it. "Die Verheissung eines Lebens auch hienieden ueber die Dauer des Lebens hienieden hinaus,--allein diese ist es, die bis zum Tode fuers Vaterland begeistern kann." (Ibid., p. 387.)

It is evident therefore that in Fichte's mind religion and patriotism are inextricably bound up. There are some who contend that he did not go as far in his deification of the fatherland as do the totalitarians of our day, but the quotations above belie this statement. And if there were any doubt left about the matter it would be removed by a perusal of a little known but significant

work which appeared in the same year as the "Reden." The writing in question is one of the "Political Fragments" and is entitled "Republik der Deutschen zu Anfang des 22. Jahrhunderts." Fichte here assumes the role of the prophet and purports to tell us what Germany will be like a few centuries hence, persumably when this 'flame of higher patriotism' has engulfed the people. Here is the picture he draws.

After Germany had through the treachery of her princes disappeared for a time she arose again to great strength and glory with a new constitution, built on the idea of infinite development through education. The lawgivers were not satisfied, however, to promulgate civil, criminal and political laws only; they also outlined a "Religionsbekenntnis der Deutschen." And now follows a description of what the church and its confessions ^{would be} ~~was~~ like in the new Germany.

The law-givers at first found the three main confessions of Christianity still in existence. They considered it necessary to add a fourth and to raise this to the general civic religion (allgemeinde buergerliche Religion) which would accompany the acts of state and sanction them (die Staatsverhandlungen begleiten und sanktionieren). (Ibid., 534.) All the freely cultured would adhere to the new religion. These learned people might still acknowledge Christ as a great teacher but as for his doctrine, anyone

could take it or leave it, or he might interpret it in terms of the new religion. Dyed-in-the-wool conservatives might adhere to the old confession and continue the old form of worship. Presumably, this will not be for long. The older people will die and soon all citizens will join the national church. But even in this transition period all will be held to observe the civic religious ceremonies (die bürgerlichen religiösen Verhandlungen) which are outlined by the state officials alongside the older forms. And on one thing the lawgivers must insist. Since upon the religion of love also the love of the fellow-citizen is based, no one will be permitted to lay claim to a salvation from which other citizens are excluded.

"The lawgivers, who had in mind to found also a general love of the fellow-citizen upon a religion of love, insisted, that everyone who hoped for another and blessed life would have to recognize everyone of his fellow-citizens as capable of that same salvation, and that no doctrine contrary to this thesis could be tolerated; they made the public recognition of this thesis a condition of citizenship; they put it into the public baptismal form; they expected the teachers of all confessions to teach this explicitly."

That simply means that it would be against the law to preach the traditional doctrines of Christianity. No one would be permitted to say to a fellow-German: "He that believeth not shall be damned." (Luke 16: 16.) A fellow-German must be looked upon as belonging to the elect of God no matter what he believes. And the reason for that is stated in the following words:

Whoever claims to know that a blessed hereafter awaits him and his fellow-believers from which others who are also his fellow-citizens are excluded, obviously considers himself and the members of his group better than the latter; and, no matter what he may contend, it is impossible and he is not to be believed, if he says, that he can honor and love and be willing to serve those, from whom he believes he will be entirely separated in the after-life, as much as those with whom he expects to spend the whole of eternity." (Ibid., p. 536.)

The lawgivers must insist on this because any other conception would destroy the spiritual unity of the 'Volk' which could no longer remain a 'totality' (ein Ganzes). What is actually implied, of course, is that the bond of citizenship is closer than any other tie, but also that the state will tell its citizens exactly what they are to believe. This is further evidenced by the articles of the new confession which are to guide the national church.

These articles are few and brief. In the first place there must be a belief in freedom and absolute independence (unumschraenkte Selbststaendigkeit). A dependence upon a divine revelation as authoritative is evidence of a slave mind. The Germans dare not have their freedom or intelligence limited by any higher authority.

Another, and in fact the chief doctrine of these "general Christians" is that they have their being, for time and eternity, in God. Fichte expresses it this way:

Religion is the knowledge of our being solely in God, and our abiding continuance in Him, and the assurance that He reveals Himself to us immediately. (Ibid., p. 537.)

Since the Bible is generally considered the 'national book' instruction is to be based upon it but the teachers of the

people may interpret it in the light of the new Christianity.

The church edifice is a beautiful building in a large open place surrounded by walls. In these walls are long rows of niches designed to hold the burial urns containing the ashes of the dead, for in the new Reich regular burial will be substituted by cremation. The highest and most honored place is reserved for those who have died on the field of battle; the second row for those who through wisdom have counseled the nation; the third for them, who, as fathers and mothers, have reared children for the fatherland. Down below, in the lowest row, is a place for the ones who have rendered practically no service to their country and therefore are not even named.

Sunday is retained as the day of worship. At an early hour the bell tolls and all the people of the parish gather in front of the church. No one who is well may be absent from the services. At a given signal the doors are thrown open and all enter the church under the strains of appropriate music. The minister is already at the altar. As soon as the people are seated the large curtain at the altar is drawn aside and cannons, muskets, and other weapons come into view. Then the justice of the peace appears and unfurls the flag.

The first act of worship is the interment of the dead which takes place according to the rank indicated above. As a sign that

the congregation has forgiven the deceased all his faults and shortcomings a blank sheet of paper is burned while the following words are spoken:

"If the earthly hull (irdische Huelle) has at times hindered the rise of the heavenly will, this has now been laid aside; may this be blotted out of our remembrance as well as that of all mortals." (Ibid., p. 542.)

After this solemn ceremony, a second, the receiving of the newborn infants, takes place. There is no baptism, however; the name of God is not even mentioned. The mother or some other woman steps before the congregation and holds the child high so that all can see it. Then a sheet of paper is produced and the name enrolled upon it. While this is going on the minister, speaks these words of consecration (die Einweihungs-formel):

"We name you Maria Meyerin (repeated by the congregation) as a sign that we, and through us the entire Fatherland of the German nation, recognize you as being capable of Reason (repeated by the congregation), as one who is partaker in all rights of our citizenship (repeated by the congregation), as co-heir of eternal life, which also we hope for (repeated by the congregation)." (Ibid., p. 544-545).

When all children have been received the pastor turns to the whole group and says:

"Live, grow and prosper! May the page in the record begun for you be the history of a moral life! May you join others in love which shall bind together all in the group in which you labor, and may brave sons and daughters take your place when you are taken from us!" (Congregation joins in this.) (Ibid., p. 545.)

Such is Fichte's conception of the ideal religion and the

ideal church. We may agree with Engelbrecht that "this astonishing fragment stands alone in Fichte's work," but we cannot agree with him when he adds that "there is nothing in the author's previous thought to prepare us for it." Engelbrecht forgets that 'triumphant nationalism' as he calls it, inevitably leads to an identification of love for the fatherland with religion. The nation assumes such importance in the life and thought of the individual that everything else pales into insignificance by comparison. Indeed, if the nation or the state is divine and the organ of God's revelation to man, then it is quite natural that everyone must stand in awe of it, and a nationalistic religion with a worship in accordance with the principles of nationalism is the logical result. The 'astonishing fragment' is, therefore, quite in line with the major political thought of Fichte, especially during his later years. And Dr. Arthur Frey of Switzerland does him no injustice when he says that Fichte is the real "father of Rosenberg's 'Myth of the Twentieth Century'." (The Ordeal of the German Church, p. 53.)

Whatever be the merit of other elements in Fichte, therefore, (and there are other elements) it cannot be denied that he is one of the prophets and founders of German nationalism and that he prepared the way for the advent of Nazism. Long before Hitler's rise to power 'Fichte-Bunde' were organized especially in the university centers of Germany and formed the rendezvous of extreme nationalists.

There is also good reason why Fichte is still one of the most popular writers in Nazi circles. R. B. Perry is right when he says that "Nationalism, popularized by the French Revolution, and consecrated by the idealistic patriotism of Fichte, claimed precedence in every field of human endeavor." (Phil. Roots of Totalitarianism, p. 27.) And Fichteanism received a mighty strengthening at the hands of an even greater thinker George Wilhelm Hegel.

George Wilhelm Hegel
(1770 - 1831)

It has been said that Hegel's system is much less personal than that of any other philosopher, that his head rather than his heart is what appears throughout both his life and his writings. Undoubtedly this is true, for Hegel was restrained and unemotional, a rather prosaic type of man, abhorring all "Schwaermerei". He insisted that thought or reason must govern all, and that if we have discovered the laws of logic we will have discovered the law of all existence. This explains the repugnance he felt for the teaching of Fichte and the later Schelling. "Pure reason, not the will, was his hero, and his hero's adventures are adventures in thought, rather than volition." (Fuller, History of Philosophy, p. 403.)

Hegel's totalitarianism is, therefore, quite different from that of his older contemporary. While Fichte's is derived above

all from his enthusiastic nationalism Hegel develops the "purely intellectual modes and processes through which the idea of the state must take shape." For him the state is an expression on the social plane of the Idea. Hence his whole political philosophy is in a much more vital sense an integral part of his general philosophy. In this respect his thought parallels that of Plato and Aristotle rather than that of Kant and Fichte. It will, therefore, be necessary to devote a little time to his fundamental ideas.

Hegel like Fichte and Schelling rebelled against Kant's dualism and the objective 'thing-in-itself', which underlies all experience. He also broke with the latter two, however, who, though repudiating Kant, still retained some kind of Absolute which could not be explained, and in Hegel's view turned out to be a purely negative quantity, "the night in which all crows are black." Hegel demanded real organic unity in which Reality is not opposed to appearance but rather explains it, in which the Absolute is not beyond experience but accounts for the many sided existence we witness round about us. "Multiplicity and variety, opposition, antagonism are all subservient to some higher principle in which they are ultimately identified and to whose being--which is an activity of reconciling and fusing them--they are necessary." (Fuller, p.404.)

This principle according to Hegel's "Phaenomenologie des Geistes" is a Process. The Real, the Absolute, is not a Substance

as Spinoza and also Schelling had maintained, nor an Ego as Fichte taught, but an on-going World-Process. It is not a super-personality or Ego which thinks the world and thus creates it. This thinking, this creating or generating, is the Absolute itself. Just as an individual is his own life or his career, so everything that has ever happened, is happening now, or will happen in the future, is the career, the life, the very being of the Absolute. This development goes on and on without regard to space or time according to a plan which is inherent in its evolution.

Differently stated we may say it is the Absolute Idea realizing itself or living out what it from time immemorial intended to be. The process involves self-consciousness and self-knowledge. Thus we may say "the Absolute Existence which realizes and makes explicit the Absolute Idea, must be conceived as a process of evolving self-consciousness culminating in complete self-knowledge or comprehension of the Idea which its development sets forth." (Fuller, p. 407.) There is then no distinction between the subject and object. The Absolute is its own object. Thinking and being are one. The Absolute is an Idea or Plan becoming conscious of itself. This Hegel finally calls "Geist" or Spirit. The Spirit is its own matter and own form. There is no actual distinction between the self-realizing activity of the Idea and the Idea itself.

In analysing the self-realizing process of Spirit we may dis-

tinguish three stages, the subjective, the objective, and the absolute spirit. Subjective spirit refers to the consciousness of the self. When self-consciousness becomes the social consciousness we have the transition from subjective to objective spirit; for common objects, common interest, and common activities are the Spirit realizing itself objectively. Spirit now thinks in terms of society or the race rather than that of the individual. The influence of objective spirit makes the individual a rational being. In society man frees himself from his blind selfishness, his subjectiveness, and identifies himself with the universal. He thus becomes a moral being and hence free in the true sense.

In absolute spirit the complete union or synthesis of all differences and distinctions takes place. The whole world-process with its apparent oppositions and contradictions, is fused into one all embracing, harmonizing and coherent reality, the self-conscious life of the Absolute.

This conception implies furthermore that the law and goal of the Absolute World-Process is not external to itself, something imposed from without. If it were, then the process would not be the Absolute, this other principle would be. Hegel says, the law and goal which governs the movement are immanent in the Absolute, in fact, are the Absolute itself. Now the law which governs both human thought and unconsciousness nature is reason, and the goal of all is likewise reason, namely self-conscious reason. Hegel puts

it this way:

"World-history--is self-caused and self-realized reason, and its actualized existence in spirit is knowledge. Hence, its development issuing solely out of the conception of its freedom is a necessary development of the elements of reason. It is, therefore, an unfolding of the spirit's self-consciousness and freedom. It is the exhibition and actualization of the Universal Spirit." (Ph. d. R., p. 342.)

It is in this sense that we must understand Hegel's oft repeated statement: "The Real is the Rational, and the Rational is the Real."

On the basis of this fundamental thought of the every-moving, ever-evolving World-Process, which Fuller calls "a dance of life--a spontaneous act of rhythmic self-expression," Hegel interprets all the operations of physical nature, of human history, of the state, of art, of religion, and of philosophy. In this study we are interested chiefly in his doctrine concerning human history and the state. The two main works that must be considered here are his "Philosophie des Rechts" and "Philosophie der Geschichte."

In developing his philosophy of the state Hegel emphasizes in the very beginning that he wishes to exhibit the state as thinkable, to develop the purely intellectual modes and processes through which the Idea of the state is realized. He says, therefore, "the idea of the state is not concerned with the historical origin of either the state in general or of any particular state with its special rights and characters." "Philosophic investigation deals

with only the inner side of all this, the thought conception (gedachter Begriff)." (Ph. of R. p. 241.) At first this might be taken to mean that Hegel is speaking of the ideal state, but that is not the case as we shall see later.

Hegel's doctrine of the state is contained chiefly in the third section of the "Philosophy of Right." There, in a lengthy discussion, he tells us again and again what he conceives the state to be. Thus we read

"The state is the realized ethical idea or ethical spirit. It is the will which manifests itself, makes itself clear and visible, substantiates itself. It is the will which thinks and knows itself, and carries out what it knows, and in so far as it knows." (p. 240.)

"The state, which is the realized substantive will, having its reality in the particular self-consciousness raised to the plane of the universal, is absolutely rational." "It is the objective spirit." (P. 240.)

"The state is an embodiment of reason." (p. 242.)

"The state as a completed reality is the ethical whole and the actualization of freedom. It is the absolute purpose of reason that freedom should be actualized. The state is the spirit, which abides in the world and there realizes itself consciously." (p. 244-245)

Similar statements we find in the introduction to this same work:

"This treatise, in so far as it contains a political science, is nothing more than an attempt to conceive of and present the state as in itself rational!" (p. XXVIII.)

"The state is the ethical world, which is in fact reason potentially and permanently actualized in self-consciousness." (. XIX.)

And also in the introduction to his "Philosophy of History"

Hegel says:

"The state is thus the embodiment of rational freedom, realizing and recognizing itself in an objective form.--The state is the idea of spirit in the external manifestation of human will and its freedom." (p. 49.)

All this will be largely unintelligible unless we view it in the light of Hegel's general philosophic thought. We must recall that for Hegel the Absolute is the eternal world-process, or the whole history of the universe. This all-embracing movement is nothing else than the Idea or Spirit realizing itself or becoming conscious of itself. Now in this process there are various stages or levels. In nature we have the manifestation of the Idea on the physical plane. In human consciousness the self-realization reaches a higher level, for the spirit becomes conscious of its freedom. But this is only subjective, for it is the exercise of the individual will or conscience. The subjective must pass into or be synthesized with the objective, and this takes place in society or the social order. This social order is not a hodge-podge of individuals thrown together and ever at variance with one another, but an organic living whole. And the highest, the most complete and perfectly developed form of the social order is the state, which absorbs and synthesizes all other human institutions.

Thus we may say that the state is a manifestation of the Spirit. "It is the spirit which abides in the world and there

realizes itself consciously." (Ibid., p. 244.) It is "reason, potently and permanently actualized" because only in society can man live the life of reason.

Again we may say that the state is the "actualization of objective freedom" or the "reality of freedom"; for in defining freedom we must not start from individual self-consciousness but from the essence (Wesen) of self-consciousness which realizes itself as sovereign might, in which individuals are only moments." (Carriett, *Morals and Politics*, p. 106.)

It is a little more difficult to understand how the state can be conceived of as "objective will." Here we must keep in mind that with Hegel thought and will are identical, and that there is no such thing as thought per se or will per se. "They are not two separate faculties. The will is a special way of thinking; it is thought translating itself into reality; it is the impulse of thought to give itself reality." (*Ph. of Right*, p. 11.) Hegel's "concept (Begriff) is a causa sui, a logically self-determining force." (Sterritt, *The Ethics of Hegel*, p. 28.) Hegel never tires of inveighing against the vice of abstraction. He does not say with Kant "the Good is what ought to be" but "the Good is." And so he cannot think of the will (the universal, not the individual will) as existing for itself in a kind of vacuum, but as really accomplishing something, as being objective, as being realized ra-

tionally. He finds the will throbbing in the social organism of humanity. For that reason he says the state, as the highest form of the social order, is 'objective' will' or the 'will objectified'. And because the will is not determined by something outside itself it is free. For we must not forget that will is thought translating itself into existence, or setting before itself an object with which it is really identified. In other words Hegel identifies the will with the system or the totality of its object and thus he can speak of the will as willing itself. "The free will wills the free will." That is the same as saying that "the state is the embodiment of concrete freedom." (Ph. of Right, p. 248.)

From all this it will be seen that the state is for Hegel not just an ordinary human institution. It is something far above that; it is divine. And indeed Hegel uses just such lofty terms, in describing the state. Ponder, for example, pronouncements such as the following:

"The state is the march of God in the world," (Es ist der Gang Gottes, das der Staat ist.) "We must contemplate the idea, this actual God." (Ph. of Right, p. 247.)

"The state is the divine will as a present spirit, which unfolds itself in the actual shape of an organized world." (p. 260.)

"The existence of the state is the work of God in the world," "the divine existing in and for itself."

"The state is the world which the spirit has made for itself." "Just so high as the spirit stands above nature, the state stands above the physical life. We must hence honor

this state as the divine on earth." (p. 276.)

"The state is the divine Idea as it exists on Earth."
(Ph. of Right, p. 41.)

Expressions such as these hardly need any comment. It is plain that Hegel actually deifies the state. No totalitarian of our day would speak in more absolute terms than he does. Thus we may say that already a hundred years before Hitler we have in a very real sense the totalitarian state. And this element in his thought becomes still more apparent when we study the position Hegel assigns to the individual in the state.

It should be noted to begin with that Hegel like Fichte has much to say about freedom, not only of the state as 'actualized freedom' but also of the freedom of the individual. We have already pointed out that the term 'freedom' can be understood in various ways. Thomas Hill Green in his very interesting "Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligations" has this to say about it:

"As to the sense given to 'freedom', it must of course be admitted that every usage of the term to express anything but a social and political relation of one man to others involves a metaphor. Even in the original application its sense is by no means fixed. It always implies indeed some exemption from compulsion by others, but the extent and conditions of this exemption, as enjoyed by the 'freeman' in different states of society, are very various. As soon as the term 'freedom' comes to be applied to anything else than an established relation between a man and other men, its sense fluctuates much more." (p. 3.)

There is certainly much truth in this. Infact, it is not too much to say that the meaning of the term depends in large measure on the ideas and the philosophy of the person using it. Hegel evidently uses the term in a metaphorical or shallve say metaphysical sense. His argument runs something like this: The state is actualized freedom; the individual, in order to be really free, must see to it that his subjective will gets in tune with the absolutely rational, objective will of the state. To be free is to be rational and "rationality consists in the thorough unity of universality and individuality. Taken concretely, and from the standpoint of the content, it is the unity of objective freedom with subjective freedom, or the general substantive will with the individaul consciousness and the individual will seeking particular ends." (Ph. of Right, p. 241.) "The individual is intended to pass a universal life," (Ibid., p. 241.) that is, if his life is shaped so that it may attain its true end, that which it has in it to become and which in the final analysis the individual really wills it to be, it will coincide with the universal, which is absolutely rational. Now since "rationality exists as the state," (Ibid., p. 266.), or what is the same thing, since the state is the manifestation of objective will, the individual attains true freedom when his subjective will coincides with the objective will of the state. "The particular self-consciousness" must be raised to the "place of the

universal" which is absolutely rational. "This substantive unity is its own motive and absolute end. In this end freedom attains its highest right." (Ph. of Right, p. 240.)

In dealing with the relation of the individual, to the state, therefore, it must ^{not} be supposed that the "decisive features of the state are to be regarded as the security and protection of property and personal freedom. If that were the case then the interest of the individual as such would be the ultimate end of the social union, but that is not true says Hegel. "The state has a totally different relation to the individual. It is the objective spirit, and he has his truth, real existence, and ethical status only in being a member of it." (Ph. of Right, p. 240-241.) In other words a person becomes a true human being only within the state. Otherwise he has no 'Objektivitaet', 'Wahrheit', or 'Sittlichkeit'.

This is, of course, essentially what is called the 'organic' view of the state which also Fichte held.

"A hand which is cut off still looks like a hand and exists though it is not real." (Ibid., p. 270.) "The true relation is illustrated by the fable of the belly and the limbs. Although the parts of an organism do not constitute an identity, yet it is of such a nature that, if one of its parts makes itself independent, all must be harmed. We cannot by means of predicates, propositions, etc., reach any right estimate of the state, which should be apprehended as an organism." (Ibid., p. 257.)

There is perhaps nothing that so forcefully brings out the totalitarian doctrine as this illustration of the body and the limbs,

for, if anything, this emphasizes the point that the whole existence of the individual is wrapped up in the life of the state. The state is a kind of individual writ large. As it would be foolish to speak of the welfare of the hand as being something different from that of the body to which it belongs so it would be foolish to separate the welfare and the interests of the citizen from those of the state. The individual obeys the state not above all because it is identified with the ethical world and with reason, and its commands with objective justice (Das Gesetz ist des Recht, als das gesetzt, was es an sich war) but because he is thereby obeying the "substance of his own being." (Ph. of R. p. 41) The state's law is his own law, for he thereby attains self-satisfaction which is his real will.

"In carrying out his duty the individual must in some way or other discover his own interest, his own satisfaction and recompense." "The individual, who from the point of view of his duties is a subject, finds, in fulfilling his civic duties, protection of person and property, satisfaction of his real self, and the consciousness and self-respect implied in his being a member of the whole." (Ph. of R., p. 251.)

In other words, duty is identified with interest. "The patriot observes his national customs and laws as expressions of his own true will." (Sterritt, p. 13.) Or to use once more the language of Rousseau, the general will and real will of the individual are identical. The individual realizes himself in so far as the state realizes itself, for only through it does he become what he has it

in him to become and what he ought to be. This identity of wills is not set aside either when an evil doer is punished, for, says Hegel, "the injury which the criminal experiences is inherently just because it expresses his own inherent will, is a visible proof of his freedom and is his right." (Ph. of R., p. 97.)

In this way Hegel tries to harmonize obedience to the law of the state and personal freedom. He contends that the common conception of freedom as consisting in doing what one likes belongs to the crudest level of thought, "containing as yet not even a suspicion of what is meant by the absolutely free will, right, the ethical system, etc." (Ph. of Right, p. 25.) Hegel calls such 'freedom' mere caprice (Willkuer) and not freedom at all.

"Ordinary man, believes that he is free, when he is allowed to act capriciously, but precisely in caprice is it inherent that he is not free." "Caprice, instead of being will in its truth, is rather will in its contradiction." (Ibid., p. 25 and 26.) "Only that will which obeys law, is free; for it obeys itself--it is independent and so free." (Ph. of H., p. 41.)

Hence freedom consists in obeying the law, and Hegel, like Rousseau, takes the view that the unperverted mind intuitively recognizes the compulsion of the social institution as fundamentally its own. We may say then that "to be a loyal citizen and to fulfill one's station is wisdom, freedom, goodness, and happiness." (Carritt, p. 107.) "The ethical man is the wise man who knows and identifies himself with his community." (Sterritt, p. 45.) And

the best education one could wish for his son, says Hegel, following Pythagoras, is to have him become a "citizen of a nation with good institutions."

It must be apparent to every one that in real life all this adds up to an absolute obedience to the state, notwithstanding Hegel's frequent protests to the contrary. The same doctrine is set forth already in his "Phaenominologie des Geistes". The root of the whole conception is the notion that in the state we are in the presence of a being infinitely higher than we are, of whom we are but an insignificant part, and that a mind, a soul, a spirit constitutes the life and directs the course of organized society always in accordance with reason. "Each becomes conscious of self by sacrificing it to the universal self, which is the nation and maintains the welfare of all." (Carritt, p. 109.)

All these totalitarian principles and pronouncements would not be so bad if we could say that Hegel has in mind the ideal state, but this we cannot do. At times, indeed, it does appear that he is speaking of the ideal state, the state as it ought to be. He distinguishes, for example, between the good and the bad state. He says, "A bad state is indeed purely finite and worldly, but the rational state is in itself infinite;" and again "a bad state is one which merely exists. A sick body also exists, but it has no true reality." (Ph. of Right, p. 270 and 271.) As we have

already heard, Hegel insists that when one is concerned with the 'idea of the state' one need not bother about its origing or the basis of its rights. Those things are "mere appearances and belong to history." (Ph. of Right., p. 241.)

Yet Hegel's predominant meaning is evidently on the other side. In the same chapter, from which the foregoing quotation is taken (p. 247) he says:

"Although a state may be declared to violate right principles and to be defective in various ways, it always contains the essential moments of its existence, if, that is to say, it belongs to the full formed states of our own time." "The state is not a work of art. Evil behavior can doubtless disfigure it in many ways, but the ugliest man, the criminal, the invalid, the cripple, are living men."

If these words mean anything they imply that any modern state, no matter how deformed or ugly it may be, still contains the essence of a real state. "The positive thing, the life, is present in spite of defects, and it is with this affirmative that we have here to deal." (Ibid., p. 247.)

This agrees also with Hegel's general thought. He roundly criticized the enlightenment because it tried to reform existing institutions on the basis of abstract right and insisted that the actual is the embodiment of historical reason. The ethical idea is realized in the state, or to express it differently, the ideal should be viewed as embodied in the actual. Now we cannot speak of "actualization" or "realization" if we mean an ideal which no-

Where exists or exists only in the mind of some philosophers or for that matter of some god. That would again be separating thought from being, and result in pure abstraction which Hegel absolutely denounces. He is never tired of insisting that the 'rational is the real'. What is, is not only intelligible (verneunftig) it is 'Vernunft' itself, and what is, is no ideal state. In the very preface to the entire work he assures us that he is on guard "against constructing a state as it ought to be, Philosophy cannot teach the state what it should be, but only how it, the ethical universe, is to be known.

Ἰδὺν Ῥόδον, ἰδὺν καὶ τὸ πύργημα.

Hic Rhodus, hic saltus.

To apprehend what is, is the task of philosophy, because what is, is reason." (Ibid., p. XXVIII.)

The same idea we find propounded in the "History of Philosophy": "The state is the actually existing, realized moral life." "It is the absolute interest of reason that this moral whole should exist." (p. 40.)

Thus we are forced to the conclusion that Hegel is speaking of the state or states as we find them to-day. His words are too plain to reach any other understanding. And since "every nation has the constitution which suits it and belongs to it" (Phil. of Right, p. 282.) at any particular time, it follows that any modern state is the 'realized ethical order' and that its laws are objective for the citizens ~~for~~ of that state,

and hence must always be obeyed. Again we arrive at a full-blown totalitarianism. The individual has no rights over against the state. He must always submit to its will. If he refuses he must be co-erced. The co-ercion is, however, no limitation of his freedom, for he is being forced to do what in his innermost nature he wishes to do.

This whole conception was in many ways a reaction against the seventeenth and eighteenth century tendency to judge all institutions and also the state in terms of and by reference to the conscience or the rights or the happiness of the individual. This criticism could easily, and in many cases was exaggerated, into an egoism which made the individual supreme, as though one counted for more than a million. The metaphysical theorists like Hegel protested against this, but went too far on the other side. They looked upon the organized society as a kind of super-entity, a spirit, a greater being, a god, to whom the individual with his thoughts of rights and aspirations of happiness is entirely subordinate, an organism which embraces the whole life of man, yes, a something which in the last analysis is more than all the individuals who compose it.

It is true, of course, that in a sense a whole is more than the sum total of its parts, but that depends on the

sense in which 'the parts' are taken. A school, for example, ~~may~~ have a certain character or stamp which it retains for generations. Hundreds may pass through the institution and all ~~may~~ be affected by its spirit. Yet that spirit remains the same. It is ever present, regardless of who or how many are at the school. Nevertheless, this spirit is not something apart from the individuals who are in the school at any one time. It is maintained by individuals. It would be ridiculous to say that you could take all the individuals out of the institution and that the school would still retain its character.

And similarly it is with the state. It is more than any one of its members, but it is never more than all the citizens with all their ramified interests and activities. All these individuals make the state what it is. If the metaphysical philosophers were right it would be quite in order to say that we could sacrifice all the citizens in order to save the state, obviously a rather grotesque piece of logic.

Then, too, ~~it~~ should be noted that thousands upon thousands of citizens have cut loose from the state in which they grew up and found happiness in a new state. Yes, in many instances they became what they had it in them to become just because of the severance from the original body politic. All this would be impossible if they were mere limbs or members

of an organism. It proves also, that the 'Sittlichkeit' of that particular nation was not the objective standard of morality, nor the actualized freedom for them.. They could live and grow and find satisfaction apart from the home~~s~~ state which, according to Hegel's totalitarian doctrine, was to envelop them whole.

But to continue with Hegel's totalitarianism. Further evidence of this is given in the exposition of what he calls the 'internal constitution'. There he explains the situation as follows:

The political state is divided into three substantive branches:

a) The power to fix and establish the universal. This is legislation.

b) The power, which brings particular spheres and individuals cases under the universal. This is the function of government.

c) The function of the prince, as the subjectivity with which rests the final decision. In this function the other two are brought into an individual unity. It is at once the culmination and the beginning of the whole. This is constitutional monarchy. (Phil. of Right, p. 278.)

In a subjoined note Hegel continues:

The perfecting of the state into a constitutional monarchy is the work of the modern world, in which the substantive idea has attained the infinite form. This is the descent of the spirit of the world into itself, the free perfection by virtue of which the idea sets loose from itself its own elements,--- and makes them totalities; at the same time it holds them within the unity of the conception, in which is found their real rationality. The story of this true erection of the ethical life is the subject matter of universal world-history.

(Ibid., p. 278.)

Thus according to Hegel the development of the constitutional monarchy makes the modern state perfect, for now we have the "descent of the spirit of the world into itself" and this signifies the "true erection of the ethical life."

Of the three powers which are held to be indispensable to the idea of the state the first two do not differ materially from the legislature and the executive of other political philosophers. It is Hegel's unique conception of the monarchic power that interests us here. He looks upon the person of the monarch as the unifying force which, so to say, holds the whole together and makes it an organism. Without the monarch as the unifying force the state is not fully developed; there would be no one to make the final decision. "The element which implies absolute decision is not individuality in general but one individual, the monarch." (Phil. of Right, p. 286.) The monarch is therefore called 'the cope-stone', the 'pinnacle' of the 'great architectonic building'. He is that one man who "stands at the helm of the state", who "comes forward as summit and essential factor of the constitution", "the ultimate self of the state's will." (Ibid., p. 295 & 291.) Though Hegel insists the monarch "may not be willful in his acts" (p. 290) he goes on to say that "appointment and dismissal (of government officials) lies in his unlimited, free, arbitrary will". (Ibid., p. 296.) That is absolutism in its

most extreme form.

But Hegel goes beyond absolutism. What he means to say is that the monarch is the embodiment of the spirit of the nation. His person gives the state personality, makes it a living, going concern, as it were. Therefore he says: "The personality of the state is actualized only as a person, the monarch." (Ibid., p. 287.) Hence if sovereignty is to be exercised there must in the last analysis be the determination of some person, there "must be spoken a human will". (Ibid., p. 291.) It does not require a keen mind to recognize the parallel here with the 'Fuehrer-concept' which is exerting such an influence in the totalitarian states at the present time.

All this implies, of course, that with Hegel there is no such thing as sovereignty resting with the people. In fact he has a rather low opinion of that part of the nation which is usually designated 'the people'. They are the ones who are really too ignorant to know what they want. Says Hegel:

It is rather true that the people, in so far as this term signifies a special part of the citizens, does not know what it wills. (Italics our own) To know what we will, and further what the absolute will, namely reason, wills, is the fruit of deep knowledge and insight, and is therefore not the property of the people. (Phil. of Right, p. 310.)

Hegel, therefore, has no use for the liberalistic doctrine of 'liberte', fraternite', egalite'. He would deny that the will of the people is the true source of political

science. For him a democracy in which the head of the state is chosen by a general vote is an 'Unding', something entirely unnatural. As well might one speak of the right of a family to choose its own head. Such a notion proceeds from "opinion, inclination, and caprice." (Ibid., p. 294.) It militates against the idea that the state is the embodiment of spirit, that it is not something accidental. But the "very conception of the monarch as the ultimate self of the state's will" implies that it is natural. Thus the monarch as a specific individual is abstracted from all other content, and is appointed to the dignity of monarch in a directly natural way, by birth, (Ibid., p. 291.) while "the election of a monarch is the worst of proceedings." (Ibid., p. 294.)

Likewise, the people do not take part generally in the making of laws. That all should "share individually in the counsels and decisions of the general affairs of the state," Hegel considers "a superficial view, having no reasonable form." (Ibid., p. 316 and 317.) The argument that since all are members of the state and its affairs are their affairs, all should have a right to have their say is foolish. It overlooks "the fact that the state is an organism only because of its reasonable form." (Ibid., p. 317.) Representative government is, therefore, to be denounced. The acceptance, Hegel says in his "Phil. der Geschichte" that "for legislative purposes generally, the people should be represented

by deputies," " is a deep rooted prejudice", for on this theory people and government are separated and there is a perversity in this antithesis. The basis of this view is the absolute validity of subjective will" and caprice, which is not freedom at all. (Phil. of History, p. 50.)

Actually then in Hegel's state the people can have no real part in the government of the nation; and this holds in spite of the elaborate demonstration that in the legislative power (gesetzgebende Gewalt) prince, administration (Regierung) and people (Volk) do have a part; for the governing is done by the nobility. Hegel would not admit that 'a man is a man for a that'. He abhors the word equality as that term is usually understood. The people are divided into classes. "A noble or governing class, represents the absolute universal spirit of the others; it is the manifestation of God. That it should be elected by the people or have the supreme authority conferred upon it would rather diminish than increase its sanctity." (Carritt, p. 112.) Its "eternal character," says Hegel, "is natural". "Hence it is called and entitled to this sphere by birth, without the accident of choice." (Phil. of Right, p. 316.)

To understand this part of Hegel's thought one must keep in mind that for him the state is not founded upon the contract of individuals nor upon the will of the thousands of its

members. That view is too atomistic for him. As we have seen, he holds the state is an organic totality, a natural entity, which cannot depend upon the capricious choice of individuals. "It is the absolute interest of reason that this moral whole should exist," (Phil of History, p. 40.) and herein lies its justification.

At this juncture we may well ask, what the relation between the various 'moral wholes' would be which exist at the same time and which are presumably all manifestations of objective spirit or reason. Hegel explains this in the section on "International Law." In a way his whole thought on this point is summed up in one of his opening sentences: "The state is not a private person, but is in itself a completely independent totality." (Phil. of Right, p. 336.) (Italics our own.) The expression 'a completely independent totality' is certainly all-embracing. It implies that states should not be regarded from "the stand of private right and morality", for "private persons have a law court over them, whereas against the state there is no power to decide what is intrinsically right and to realize this decision." (Ibid., p. 336.) And again, "The nation as a state is the spirit substantively realized and directly real; hence it is the absolute power on earth". (Ibid., p. 337) What people always seem to forget, Hegel would say, is that

the state is the spirit realized, or reason actualized. Hence every politically self-conscious nation is a complete totality, absolutely free, having 'absolute power'. It cannot be subject to a higher power, and there cannot, therefore, be a law governing its relations with other states.

Kant's idea that universal peace should be secured by an alliance of states "assumes that nations are in accord" which they are not, at least not for long. Any agreement is therefore "liable to be disturbed by the element of contingency", for the state is not obligated to a higher law than its own; being absolute there is no power that can force it to keep an agreement with another state. All stipulations which they make with one another are only 'provisional'. And the reason Hegel states in these words:

Because the relation of states to one another has sovereignty as its principle, they are so far in a condition of nature one to the other. Their rights have reality not in a general will, which is constituted as a superior power, but in their particular wills. Accordingly the fundamental proposition of international law remains a good intention (Italics our own.) while in the actual situation the relation established by the treaty is being continually shifted or abrogated.

A state, then, has a right to break an agreement any time it sees fit. If controversies occur the only recourse is to war; and this is quite ethical, says Hegel. "The state, as the ethical substance, has directly its reality or right not in an abstract but in a concrete existence. This existence, and not

one of the many general thoughts held to be moral commands, must be the principle of its conduct." (Ibid., p. 340.) In other words a 'self-dependent state' as the 'spiritual whole' may make war on a neighbor state any time circumstances seem to demand. And this means also what is commonly called an offensive war, for "threatened danger arising from the possible action of the other state" is due cause for opening hostilities. "Well-being," pronounces Hegel, "constitutes the highest law in its relation to another." (Ibid., p. 339.)

But from another standpoint wars are not an evil, according to Hegel, but a positive good, for by them "finite pursuits are rendered unstable, and the ethical wealth of peoples is preserved. Just as the movement of the ocean prevents the corruption which would be the result of perpetual calm, so by war people escape the corruption which would be occasioned by a continuous or eternal peace." (Ibid., 331) And again, "As a result of war peoples are strengthened; nations which are involved in civil quarrels, winning repose at home by means of war abroad." (Ibid., p. 331.)

Accordingly it would be quite all right, since the welfare of the state demands it, to wage war on another state, in order to have internal peace. And if we ask who decides upon this momentous question which involves the sacrifice of thousands, if not millions, of human beings, Hegel answers,

this belongs to the function of the prince or the monarch, for he, as the individual summit, commands the armed forces, and he alone entertains relations with other states, and decides upon peace and war." (Ibid., p. 335.) Thus war and aggression are not only justified as necessities but declared to be positive ethical goods.

All this is, of course, the logical sequence of the general proposition that the state is 'a completely independent totality' or 'objective reason', subject only to its own will. By that token it can do no wrong. This is exactly the strain in which Machiavelli wrote his "Prince". Morals and politics are not opposed to each other. Those who harbor such views give evidence of "a shallow notion both of morality and of the nature of the state in relation to morality." (Ibid., p. 340.) The true "idea of the state involves that the opposition between right or abstract freedom on one side and the complete specific content or well-being on the other is superseded." (Ibid., p. 339.)

As between warring nations the only thing that decides the issue of right is the final result as viewed from the standpoint of world-history. What may seem wrong from the individual's point of view is but a part of the larger moral whole. The mere fact that one side has been victorious in a struggle shows that it is right for also this result is the world-spirit being actualized. That is of course only another way of saying that God is always on the side

x for at times we are told that there is 'no judge over states'
(Ibid., -. 338.) and then again we read that world history
'constitutes itself absolute judge over states'. (248.)
However, it is not our purpose to make Hegel's statements
agree.

of those who have the largest cannon or that 'might is right'. Hegel sums all this up by saying: "Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht." (World History is the judgment of the world) (Ibid., p. 341.) We are thus lead to his philosophy of history.

Not everything that Hegel says about universal history or the universal spirit can be made to harmonize with his rhapsodies about the absolute power and independence of the state, ^Xfor at times according to Hegel world-history (Weltgeschichte) is

"self-caused and self-realized reason, and its actualized existence in spirit is knowledge. Hence, its development issuing solely out of the conception of the freedom is a necessary development of the elements of reason. It is, therefore, an unfolding of the spirit's self-consciousness and freedom." (Phil. of Right, p. 342.)

What Hegel would say is that the world-spirit is forever trying to become conscious of its own freedom and thus to realize that freedom. It is always trying to become actually what it always was potentially. In this struggle spirit is affected by consciousness and will which are influenced by the natural life. Hence we may say spirit is at war with itself; it has to overcome itself as its most formidable obstacle. "What spirit really strives for is the realization of its own ideal being." (Phil. of H., 57.) The goal is "spirit in its completeness, in its essential nature, i.e., freedom." (Ibid., p. 58.) We should, therefore, define world-history as "the exhibition of the divine, absolute development of

spirit in its highest forms." (Ibid., p. 55.)

To understand this aright we must keep in mind that world events are not the result of the working of spirit as though the spirit were the producer and history a record of what it has produced. That, according to Hegel, would again be making a mere abstraction of the spirit. No, the movement, the development is the spirit. The spirit of the world is "only the movement of its activity in order to know itself absolutely, to free its consciousness from mere direct naturalness." (Phil. of R., p. 345.) That brings us back to the fundamental theses in Hegel's general philosophy that the Absolute is the World-Process.

In this grandiose developmental movement everything that has ever happened finds its proper place and ultimately also its justification; for

"justice and virtue, wrong, force, and crime, talents and their results, small and great passions, innocence and guilt, the splendour of individuals, national life, independence, the fortune and misfortune of states and individuals, have in the sphere of conscious reality their definite meaning and value, and find in that sphere judgment and their due." (Ph. of R., p. 343.)

We must not make the mistake to judge these things on the basis of moral law supposedly revealed by God or dictated by the individual conscience. In the absolute, evil itself is reconciled unto itself. Wickedness and suffering, goodness and pleasure are all part of the divine scheme which that ineffable thing called spirit has imposed

upon us, and which from the larger view must be counted to it for righteousness; for the world is governed by spirit or reason and therefore must be good. "Reason governs the world, and has consequently governed its history." (Phil. of H., p. 26.) "Universal reason does realize itself." It is philosophy that leads us to the insight that "the real world is as it ought to be--that the truly good--the universal divine reason--is not a mere abstraction, but a vital principle capable of realizing itself." (Ibid., p. 37 and 38.) And the state is the shape assumed by spirit in its complete realization in phenomenal existence.

In accordance with this view Hegel says that great leaders of states, 'world-historical individuals' as he calls them, are not to be judged like other men. They are the agents of the world spirit. "Their deeds, their words are the best of that time." (Ibid., p. 32.) Even though men like Caesar, Alexander, or Napoleon may not have been conscious of it, the execution of their design was "an independently necessary feature in the history of the world." (p. 31.) "They derived their purposes and their vocation from that inner spirit." They were guided by an "unconscious impulse that occasioned the accomplishment of that for which the time was ripe." (Ibid., p. 31.) Even a monster like Ivan the Terrible, who massacred thousands, often for little or no cause, was accomplishing that for which 'the time was ripe'. "So mighty a form must trample

down an innocent flower, and crush to pieces many an object in its path." (Ibid., p. 34.)

We are to believe then, that the deeds of such world-historical figures are exempt from the claims of morality. "Against them we must not raise the litany of private virtues of decency, modesty, humanity, and charity." (Carritt, p. 115.) All this tallies exactly with the preachments of the arch-prophet of totalitarianism today, who has said, "we will then feel that, in a world in which power alone is always master of weakness and forces it into obedient service or else breaks it, there can be no special laws valid for men." (Mein Kampf, p. 147.)

And what, we ask again, becomes of the individual in this world movement? Evidently in Hegel's scheme of things he is a moment of such insignificance as to escape the attention of providence. At any rate it would seem sheer blasphemy for him to criticize the "agent of the world-spirit" or even to oppose what 'is a necessary feature in the history of the world'. History is so all-embracing that mere individuals fall outside the sphere of its notice. "Particular persons are only phases." (Ph. of R., p. 247.) And again, "the particular is for the most part of too trifling value as compared with the general: Individuals are sacrificed and abandoned." "As a general rule they come under the category of means to an ulterior end." (Ph. of H., 34.)

In speaking of great men, however, we should note that for Hegel they were great because they were founders and leaders of states, Reason wants the 'moral whole' to exist, and "herein lies the justification and merit of heroes who have founded states,--however rude these may have been." (Ibid., p. 40.) The period before the rise of states is ante-historical'. The growth of families into clans and of clans into peoples, this long series of facts which depicts the struggle of man to a higher level,--"a process which is so rich in interest, and so comprehensive in extent,--has occurred without giving rise to history;" (Ibid., p. 65.) for "history is the development of the consciousness of freedom on the part of spirit," and without political life there can be no thought of freedom.

Now in the long process of the unfolding of universal spirit, though in a sense every people has its part, yet certain nations are preeminently the embodiment of spirit. In their "Volksgeist" is the expressed the "Weltgeist" in a particular way and in large measure. Such nations are, then, "for a given epoch dominant." (Ph. of R., p. 343.)

In general, according to the principles of Hegelian dialectic, we can distinguish three phases or states in the development of spirit,--The Oriental, the Greek and the Roman, and the Germanic. (Ph. of H., p. 19.) Elsewhere Hegel says that "as the different forms of the spirit's self-consciousness, as they appear in the

process of liberation, are four, so, in accordance with these four principles, there are four world-historical empires," (Ph. of R., p. 346.)--The Oriental, the Greek, the Roman, and the Germanic. "The history of the world, then, travels from East to West, for Europe is absolutely the end of history, Asia the beginning." "The East knew and to the present day knows that one is free; the Greek and Roman world that some are free; the German world knows that all are free." (Ph. of H., p. 109 and 110.)

What Hegel means to say may be briefly explained as follows: The destiny of the world at large is the coming to consciousness of its own freedom on the part of spirit. The political life of the Orient is not very well developed. There is some realization of rational freedom but this does not advance to the subjective stage. The individual "unconsciously projects the legislative principle into some 'governing power' (one or several), and obeys it as if it were an alien, extraneous force, not the voice of that spirit of which he himself (though at this stage imperfectly) is an embodiment." (Translator's footnote, Ph. of H., p. 110.) Thus obedience is the law of his being, not freedom. That is despotism. The only one in such a state who is free is the despot himself; but in the last analysis he is not free either for his freedom is mere caprice. "That one is therefore only a despot, not a free man." (Ibid., p. 19.) "The East is, therefore the childhood of

of history." (Ibid., p. 111.)

In the Greek world we have an advance in the march towards freedom. This may be compared with the period of adolescence; for "here we have individualities forming themselves." Morality is impressed on individuality, and consequently denotes "the free volition of individuals." These individuals act according to the precepts of justice and the laws of the state, but they do so unreflectingly. They have no real understanding of what is going on. "The individual is therefore in unconscious unity with the idea." (Ibid., p. 113.)

In the Roman state, which may be likened unto "the severe labors of the manhood of history," the state on the one hand, "begins to have an abstract existence," and on the other hand, there arises the philosophical recognition of the person and his rights as such. This constitutes progress in the development of subjective freedom. However, both in Greece and Rome, only some were free. Slavery flourished, indeed, the whole civilization was built upon slavery. Hence man as such was not free.

The consummation of the development of spirit into conscious freedom we find in the German world. "German nations," says Hegel, "were the first to attain the consciousness, that man, as man, is free: That it is the freedom of spirit which constitutes its essence." (Ibid., p. 19.) This phase begins with the advent of

Christianity, which is the religion of freedom. In the long struggle between the inner and the outer, between the particular and the universal, there finally takes place a harmonization of the two. The individual wills the universal. His will and the universal will become one; he freely wills the universal good. This stage corresponds to the period of old age. Old age in nature means senility and weakness, but in the realm of spirit it is "perfect maturity and strength." "Freedom has found the means of realizing its ideal, its true existence." (Ibid., p. 115 and 116.) Thus, as Dunning says, "with bemumbing legend the philosopher makes the common-place facts of familiar history fit themselves nicely at the word into the categories and relations of his logic, and shows us mankind through all the ages marching steadily but unconsciously along Hegelian lines toward the Germanic perfection of the nineteenth century." (Political Theories, III, p. 165.)

At the risk of being monotonous we must again warn against a misunderstanding of what Hegel's means with 'freedom'. At first blush it might seem that he is a liberal and that his whole philosophy of history is the very antithesis of totalitarianism; but that is not the case. Subjective freedom for Hegel is not what is usually understood by that term. As we have seen, it is the union of the subjective with the rational will or the synthesis of the universal essential will with that of the individual. This con-

the "moral whole, or the state, which is that form of reality in which the individual has and enjoys his freedom." (Ibid., p. 40.) And this is not to be understood in the sense that the individuals in a state limit their own freedom so that the universal freedom might secure a small share for each. "Rather," says Hegel, "we affirm, are law, morality, government, and they alone, the positive reality and completion of freedom." (Ibid., p. 40.) By this token, it would seem, that the more law and government we have the better. The more the whole life of the individual is controlled by the state the nearer he gets to that which is 'the substance of his own being', rational freedom. That's why Hegel can say, quite consistently, "that all the worth which the human being possesses--all spiritual reality,--he possesses only through the state." (Ibid., p. 40-41.)

And there is one more point in connection with Hegel's ideas on history which is of importance for our consideration. Like Fichte he exhibits the usual tendency of philosophers to represent their own times and their own nation as the climax and the summation of progress. Thus Hegel pronounces with much assurance: "The German spirit is the spirit of the new world." Hence "the destiny of the German peoples is to be the bearer of the Christian principle, the principle of spiritual freedom." (Ibid., p. 354.) And a little further on we are told: "The Christian world is the world of completion; the grand principle of being is realized, consequently the

end of days is fully come." (Ibid., p. 355.)

After that there is not much more that can be said, unless in the Hegelian logic the end equals 'not-end' and there is a synthesis of the two, which is beyond the end. However, the words are a bit too plain. Objective freedom has been realized and "this is the ultimate result which the process of history is intended to accomplish." (Ibid., p. 116.) If the 'ultimate' has been reached we need look for no more progress. In the German people world-history has reached its sublimest height. The German nation is the very apex of humanity. And all this has been fore-ordained in the eternal counsels of God for "the Germans were predestined to be the bearers of the Christian principle, and to carry out the idea as the absolutely rational aim." (Ibid., p. 368.)

What this implies is plain. If the German nation is really the unique embodiment of the universal spirit then it has a special mission to carry out and in consequence special rights and privileges over against other nations. And indeed this is just what Hegel teaches. According to him "the principle of the modern world as a whole is freedom of subjectivity," (Ph. of R., p. 281.) and this principle is the natural principle of the German state. To it, therefore is "assigned the accomplishment of this stage through the process characteristic of the self-developing self-consciousness of the world-spirit." (Ph. of R., p. 343.) Hence this nation is

'dominant', and "in contrast with the absolute right of this nation to be the bearer of the current phase in the development of the world-spirit, the spirits of other existing nations are void or right, and they, like those whose epochs are gone, count no longer in the history of the world." (Ibid., p. 343-344.)

The duty of other nations can therefore never be in doubt. Since the Germans are 'Traeger der Kultur' other peoples ought to look to Germany for leadership. They can do better than to submit to it as the representative of the world-spirit, not only because they are 'void of right', but because it is also in their own interest, for it is self-evident that the wisest and the best should rule. That is stating the idea of 'Herrenvolk' just as plainly and with quite as much pride as we find it in "Mein Kampf". The only difference is that Hegel expresses it in loftier strains than does the Nazi Fuehrer.

And finally we must say a little more about Hegel's idea of religion and the church. We find his thought on this subject particularly in the section "Internal Polity" in the "Philosophy of Right", and in the introduction of the "Philosophy of History".

As already stated Hegel is an outspoken proponent of the deification of the state. The state is for him 'the divine, existing in and for itself', or 'the divine will as a present spirit, which unfolds itself in the actual shape of an organized world'. (Phil. of

R., p. 260.) It must, therefore, be the supreme object of man's devotion. There can be no separation of church and state. In fact, this idea is abhorrent to Hegel. "The state as the nation's spirit, is the law which permeates all its relations, ethical observances, and the consciousness of its individuals." (Ph. of R., p. 282.)

Religious obligation and political obligation are really identical. Indeed, Hegel cannot think of one spirit as embodied in religion or the church and another in the state. He is an enemy of all dualism. There is really only one spirit as such, and the state, he has told us, is the 'realized ethical spirit'. "Philosophy teaches us that all the qualities of spirit exist only through freedom," (Ph. of H., p. 18.) and freedom is actualized only in the state.

There is, then, an evident ambiguity in Hegel's later protestations that there exists above the state a realm of pure spirit, namely the free realm of art, religion, and philosophy. He speaks in such absolute terms of the state that if words mean anything we cannot make such a distinction; in fact, we find passages in Hegel where he says this in so many words. Take, e.g., the following statement in his introduction to the "Philosophy of History":

"We observe, therefore an essential union between the objective side--the idea,--and the subjective side--the personality that conceives and wills it. The objective existence of this union is the state, which is therefore the basis and centre of the other concrete elements of the life of a people,--of art, of law, of morals, or religion, of science." (p. 51.)

Here we are told definitely that religion, as one element in the life

of the people, has its basis and centre in the state. And though Hegel insists in the next sentence that "among the forms of this conscious union religion occupies the highest position," still it is just one form of the union which is the state. That is quite consistent with what he has to say in the "Philosophy of Right": "To the deepest religious feeling there is present the state as a whole." (p. 262.)

In the further exposition of his theory of religion Hegel says that the difference between the province of religion and that of the state is this, that "religion is the relation to the absolute in the form of feeling, imagination, faith," or intuition (Ph. of R., p. 260.), whereas "the state works and acts in obedience to conscious ends, known principles and laws, which are not merely implied, but expressly before its consciousness." (Ibid., p., 258.) And again,

"The state in general knows its own ends, recognizes them with a clear consciousness, and busies itself with them in accordance with fundamental principles, while religion, though it has truth for its universal object this content is merely given and its fundamental principles are not recognized through thinking and conceptions." (p. 266.)

"Feeling, sensibility, and fancy are the ground on which religion is built, and on this ground everything has the form of subjectivity. The state, on the other hand, actualizes itself, and gives its phases a solid reality." (Ibid., p. 272.)

Hence "whenever the church takes up the point of doctrine, and deals in its teaching with objective thought and principles of the ethical

and rational, it passes over into the province of the state."

(Ibid., p. 267.) That can only mean that the state must tell the church what to teach. The church has no solid basis; it is all faith and feeling and subjectivity. If the individual, therefore, wants to know definitely what is ethical and right he must not go to his church but to the state; for "in contrast with faith and the authority of the church, in contrast with the subjective convictions which it requires, the state is that which knows." (Ibid., p. 267.) (Italics our own.)

In one sense, Hegel tells us, it is quite all right to say that the state is founded upon religion, for ethical and political principles pass over into the realm of religion and must be established in reference to religion; on the other hand, however,

"there remains to the state the right and the form of self-conscious objective rationality, the right, that is, to maintain objective reason against the assertions which have their source in the subjective form of truth, no matter what depth of certitude and authority surrounds them." (l.c.)

That is stating the supremacy of the state pretty definitely. There is no religious freedom in Hegel's state. The church is absolutely subject to political authority, and that not only because it is an external organization but also with regard to doctrine. And this finds its justification in the fact that "the principle of the states's form is universal, and hence essentially the thought, freedom of thought and scientific investigation issue from the state,

It was a church that burnt Giordano Bruno, and forced Galileo to recant upon his knees." (l.c.)

In his Introduction to the "Philosophy of History" Hegel gives this whole conception a somewhat different turn, developing the idea of the 'spirit of the people'. This spirit, he says, may be likened unto the soul of the individual. As the soul of a person exists only as the "complex of its faculties", so the soul or spirit of a people exists as the complex of all its particular affairs. "The actual state is animated by this spirit." (Ph. of R., p. 52.) It is "determinate and particular spirit", "one individuality which, presented in its essence as God, is honored and enjoyed in religion." (Ph. of R., p. 55.) So the spirit of the people finally emerges as God Himself and this spirit is the object of worship on the part of individuals. Man must not look upon it as something apart from himself. It is his and he is representative of it. It is also necessary that he "attain a conscious realization of this his spirit and essential nature, and of his original identity with it." (Ph. of R., p. 52.)

Religion, Hegel goes on to say, is, therefore "the sphere in which a nation gives itself the definition of that which it regards as the true." (l.c.) A nation may make a mistake in its conception of truth, and then its religion eventuates in a fanaticism which cannot be the basis of a true state. But if we ask: What is

the truth? Hegel answers: "Truth is the unity of the universal and subjective will; and the universal is to be found in the state."

(Ibid., p. 41.) Indeed, the state is this "unity of the universal, essential will, with that of the individual;" (Ibid., p.40.) and

"The saying of the wisest man of antiquity is the only true one,--to be moral is to live in accordance with the moral traditions of one's country." (Werke, Vol. I, p. 400.)

It is interesting to note that Hegel always believed he was keeping strictly to the ground occupied by the Reformation. He was thankful to the Reformation because it broke the power of the church and helped the state to its high place of dignity. "It is far from being a weakness or misfortune for the state," he says, "that the church has been divided. Only through this division has the state been able to develop its true character, and become a self-conscious, rational, and ethical reality." (Ph. of R., p. 270.) Hegel, therefore, does not look with favor upon the Catholic church, for he maintains "the Catholic confession, although sharing the Christian name with the Protestant, does not concede to the state an inherent justice and morality," whereas in the Protestant principle this concession is fundamental. (Ibid., p. 54.)

Stripped of the Hegelian terminology Hegel's theory of religion may be reduced to this: Politics and religion are one. The state is the focus of religion as well as of the other elements in the life of a people. Art, religion, and philosophy all occupy the same

general ground as the state, and are therefore "inseparately united with the spirit of the state." (Ibid., p. 54.) And really this is only logical if the state is the 'actual God', the embodiment of all that is good on earth. The individual citizen must regard such a super-entity with awe and reverence and find his greatest happiness and the highest good in political obligation. It is, therefore, quite consistent for Hegel to say that the state "is its own motive and absolute end" and that "this end has the highest right over the individual, whose highest duty in turn is to be a member of the state." (Ph. of R., p. 240.)

Thus also Hegel's ideas on religion are but another proof of his thorough-going totalitarianism. Indeed, it is not too much to say that no one, either before or after Hegel, has developed this doctrine more elaborately than he did. Political thought was never quite the same since his time. How potent a force he was we see very clearly if we study the writing of a man like Heinrich von Treitschke, to whom we now turn. Though Treitschke approached the problem from an altogether different angle he betrays the influence of his great forbear on almost every page.

Heinrich von Treitschke
(1834 - 1896)

About the middle of the nineteenth century there arose in Germany a powerful school of historians whose admitted aim was to glorify the Prussian state. These men dug into the records of the past, not above all for the purpose of relating what had happened in former years, but in order to influence public opinion of their own times. They were interested in showing from past history what should be done now. In other words they were political prophets and propagandists who wished to make history as well as record it.

And it must be admitted that they accomplished their purpose to a remarkable degree. Brilliant writers and at the same time enthusiastic about their mission, they succeeded in transforming the political view of the mass of the German people so that republicans and democratic movements were checked, if not entirely uprooted, and Prussian hegemony with its paternal domination and control by an aristocratic bureaucracy was accepted as quite the thing. And, what is of special importance here, their influence continued long after their death. Their ideas carried over into the twentieth century and even survived the Bismarckian empire they helped to glorify. For the points of similarity between the Prussianistic doctrine proclaimed by these men almost a century ago and the totalitarianism of Hitlerian Germany are not hard to trace.

Of these outstanding historians (Droysen, Sybel and others might

be mentioned) Heinrich von Treitschke was easily the most popular and the most influential. Though actually of Slavic (Czechish) ancestry he was a real Prussian at heart and is rightly called one of the 'great apostles of German Nationalism'.

Treitschke began his career at the universities of Leipzig, Freiburg, and Jena. Even here, outside Prussia, he preached his Prussian gospel with such fervor that he was anything but popular. But it was at the University of Berlin where he did his real work. Here, as the personal friend of the Kaiser and of Bismarck, he labored for over twenty years until his death in 1896. However, Treitschke was more than a propagandist and professor of history. He was a political philosopher as well. In his famous lectures on politics he developed a well defined system of thought concerning the state. Because he presented his doctrine with such great enthusiasm and in almost poetical language he attracted students by the thousands, and was therefore, a mighty factor in moulding the minds of the youth of Germany.

There is some difference between the political views of the younger and the elder Treitschke, but essentially he was always the ardent advocate of a strong national government. It was the idea of the "Zwangstaat" particularly that he took over from Fichte and Hegel. His fundamental these is: THE STATE IS POWER. All he has to say about politics is really based upon this idea, which may

rightly be called the key to his whole system.

In defining the state, therefore, Treitschke says: "The state is the people legally united as an independent power." (Lectures of Politics, Selections, p. 9) (Note: Quotations in this section are from these selections by Gowan, unless otherwise indicated.) To him the idea that the state was based upon the consent of the governed was foolish for it was contrary to experience. Likewise the state was not based upon reason. It was not the embodiment of 'Geist' as Hegel had taught, nor was it the totality of the people. The people are not amalgamated with it, he insists. To Treitschke the state

On principle does not ask how the people is disposed It is a step in advance when the silent obedience of the citizens becomes an inward, rational consent, but this consent is not absolutely necessary. What the state needs, is in the first place what is external; it wills that it be obeyed, its nature is to execute what it chooses. One may say: "Power is the principle of the state, as faith is the principle of the church, and love of the family." (Italics our own.) (p. 12)

This power state, Treitschke further assures us, has always existed. In this respect he agrees with Aristotle who held that the state was 'prior to the individual' and that man would not be human without it. The notion of a prepolitical state of nature or a social contract a la Rousseau was completely rejected by Treitschke. He maintained

"The state is primordial and necessary it is as enduring as history and no less essential to mankind than speech

. Creative political genius is inherent in man and
. the state, like him, subsists from the beginning. The
attempt to present it as something artificial, following upon
a natural condition, has fallen completely into discredit
We can imagine humanity without a number of important attributes;
but humanity without government is simply unthinkable.
. Man is driven by his political instinct to construct
a constitution as inevitably as he constructs a language.
(Politics, I., 3-7)

This natural necessity of a constituted order is further displayed
by the fact that the political institutions of a people, broadly
speaking, appear to be external forms which are the inevitable
outcome of its inner life. Just as its language is not the product
of caprice but the immediate expression of the most deep-rooted
attitude towards the world, so also the political institutions
regarded as a whole, and the whole spirit of its juris-prudence,
are the symbols of its political genius (Politics, I, 10.)

Treitschke is quick to add, however, that there is one essential
difference between the evolution of the state and of a language.
A language develops more or less spontaneously and unconsciously,
but in the case of the state "we see that the conscious will co-
operates in the building in far greater measure." (Ibid.,
I, p. 10.) No doubt he had men like Emperor William and Bismarck
in mind, who by imposing their will upon the whole body created the
Prussian state. A state is therefore not an "academy of arts,
still less a stock exchange." (p. 100.) It is an 'independent power',
"power which makes its will to prevail." (Pol. I, p. 22.)

It is a mistake, therefore, says Treitschke, to identify the
state with society, for society is not the product of a conscious
will. It is not a unit and hence we can have no duties and obliga-

tions towards it. Society is but a mixture of all kinds of elements which are forever warring with each other, for "its natural tendency is towards conflict, and no suggestion of any aspiration after unity is to be found in it." (Ibid., I, p. 46) The state, however, is

"the legal unity which counterbalances this multiplicity of interests, and it is only playing with words to speak of political and social science as two separate things. Law and peace and order can not spring from the manifold and eternally clashing interests of society, but from the power which stands above it, armed with the strength to restrain its wild passions. . . . (Ibid., I, p. 47.)

That it is at bottom always power that counts, tender natures find difficult to believe, but it is true and history bears this out, says Treitschke. At all times it has been the states which were stern and willing to use force that have endured and achieved their purpose. Genius is of no avail. As proof of this we have only to review the history of cultivated Athens and dour Sparta, or of refined Florence and militant Venice. A state that "neglects its power in favor of the ideal strivings of mankind, renounces its nature and goes to ruin." (p. 141.) Weaker nations are always forced to the wall and rightly so. Indeed, "in this everlasting for and against of different states lies the beauty of history; to wish to abolish this rivalry is simply unreason. Mankind has perceived this in all ages." (p. 11.)

Since the state is above all power "its essence is this, that it can suffer no higher power above itself." (p. 14.) As soon as

it does it ceases to be a state in the true sense. Herein lies the ludicrousness, of the small state, says Treitschke. It passes as a power, whereas it is really weak. That can only have the result that a beggarly state of mind is produced which judges the state by the amount of taxes it raises. This begets materialism; and that is the reason the "small state has so pernicious an effect on the mind of its citizens." (p. 18.) "It is only the state that is powerful that corresponds to our idea." (p. 17.)

Treitschke will, therefore, hear nothing of a super-state or a world-state. He insists it cannot be the future of the human race to form one single political power. "The idea of a world-state is odious; the ideal of one state containing all mankind is no ideal at all." (p. 9.) The eternal conflict between a plurality of nations guarantees progress. Humanity would stagnate without it.

But does not the power-state limit itself by treaties and international law? No, says Treitschke, a treaty may be made but in reality the sovereignty of the state is not affected; for any so-called limitation is always voluntary, and

"all international treaties are written with the stipulation: *rebus sic stantibus*. A state cannot possibly bind its will for the future in respect to another state. The state has no higher judge above it, and will therefore conclude all its treaties with that silent reservation. This is vouched for by the truth, that, so long as there has been a law of nations, at the moment that war was declared between the contending

states all treaties ceased; but every state has as sovereign the undoubted right to declare war when it chooses, consequently every state is in the position of being able to cancel any treaties which have been concluded." (p. 15.)

It should be noted in this connection that Treitschke is not explaining an all too obvious fact of history. He is not telling us what experience has taught, and that this is to be regretted. By no means; this is as it ought to be. A state has a perfect right to alter or abolish a treaty arbitrarily simply because it is a state. Not only that, such action is even a blessing to mankind for "upon this constant alteration of treaties the progress of history is founded. . . . Treaties that have outlived themselves must be denouged." (p. 15.) Of course it is the power-state itself that decides when the time comes to alter a treaty. It cannot recognize an arbiter outside or above itself. "The erection of an international court of artibration as a permanent institution is incompatible with the nature of the state." (p. 16.) Perhaps in minor matters one might consent to arbitration, but where questions of vital importance are concerned no state can trust the judgment of any one else. In this connection Treitschke cites the problem of Alsace-Lorraine and asks: "Who will seriously believe that an arbiter could be impartial?" (l.c.) It is a matter of honor for a state to decide such questions herself. "Thus there can be no final international tribunal at all." (l.c.)

That is but another way of saying that the larger questions are

decided by force. It is the nation which has power that makes its word count. The smaller nations which are weak hardly deserve the name and have really forfeited their right of existence. "The larger states are gaining ever more predominance" and "the whole development of our company of states aims unmistakably at ousting the states of second rank." (p. 17.) Quite bluntly, therefore, Treitschke approves of a policy of aggression. It is quite all right for the state of power to rape an innocent neighbor, simply because it can be done.

"If it does not make a compact whole the state must try to round it off more conveniently. This, however, applies only to great states who are keenly conscious of themselves, and take pride in the belief in their great future. They can not allow raggedness in their territory." (Politics, I, p.36.)

Particularly so far as the non-European world is concerned Germany has always gotten the worst of it. Now that she has power, Treitschke advises, she should demand her share lest other powers get the major part of the booty. "The nation which does not take a share in this great rivalry will play a pitiful part at some later day. It is therefore a vital question for a great nation today to display a craving for colonies." (p. 40.)

Since the state is power, Treitschke tells us, the aim of the state is a twofold one: "It is power in an external direction and the regulation of justice internally." (p. 21) Hence one of the fundamental functions of the state is to organize and maintain an

army. Treitschke is a militarist of the first water. When he speaks of power he means physical power, and that resides in the military. A person is stupid if he does not recognize this, for "now even the average man feels that military affairs stand higher than economic interests, that they are exalted above price." (p. 44.) Indeed "a state contradicts its own nature if it neglects the army." (p.100.) "It remains the normal and rational course when a great nation embodies and develops in an organized army the nature of the state, which is precisely power, by means of its physical strength." (p. 103.) Universal military service is, therefore, quite the thing and "it is a defect of English civilization that it does not know it." (p. 102.)

However, a powerful army is not organized above all for the purpose of keeping the citizens within the bounds or of protecting them against attack. In this same chapter on "The Aim of the State" Treitschke says very emphatically that "the second essential function of the state is to make war." (p. 21.) 'Blessed are the peacemakers' does not fit into the Treitschkian philosophy. War is the creator of states for "all the states known to us have arisen through wars." (p. 22.) It is proof of the effeminacy of some civilian thinkers that in the science of the state this has not been appreciated.

"Without war there would be ^{no} state at all. . . . War will last till the end of history, as long as there is a plural num-

ber of states. That it could ever be other wise is neither to be deduced from the laws of thought or from the human nature, nor in any way desirable. The blind worshippers of perpetual peace commit the error of thought, that they isolate the state or dream of a world-state, which we have already recongized as something irrational The great strides which civilization makes against barbarism and unreason are only made actual by the sword Most undoubtedly war is the one remedy for an ailing nation. Social selfishness and party hatreds must be dumb before the call of the state when its existence is at stake. . . . In war the chaff is winnowed from the wheat. The historian who moves in the world of real Will sees at once that the demand for eternal peace is purely reactionary." (p. 22.)

Look at the Dutch, says Treitschke, How splendid they were when engaged in war with the world-power Spain; but "the curse of peace" came to them and "the once so brave Dutchmen have turned into creditors of the state and have degenerated thereby, even physically. That is the curse of a people that is quite engrossed in social life and loses the taste for political greatness." (p. 20.)

In his enthusiasm for war Treitschke even goes so far as to claim that it is sacred and highly moral.

"To the end of history arms will maintain their rights; and in that very point lies the sacredness of war. (p. 16.) We have learned to know the moral majesty of war in the very thing that appears brutal and inhuman to superficial observers. That one must overcome the natural feelings of humanity for the sake of the fatherland, that in this case men murder one another who have never harmed one another before and who perhaps esteem one another highly as chivalrous enemies, that is at first glance the awfulness of war, but at the same time its greatness also." (p. 103.)

In accordance with these views Treitschke is quite convinced that "it is precisely political idealism that demands wars, while

materialism condemns them." (p. 24.) The idea of perpetual peace is 'nonsense' for "without war all movement, all growth must be struck out of history." (p. 25.) Treitschke even quotes Scripture in support of his position. He tells us that all reference to Christianity in this case is perverse for the Bible says explicitly that the powers that be shall bear the sword. (p. 24.)

Such glorification of the state and of aggressive power quite naturally led Treitschke to a rabid nationalism and tribalism. He is thoroughly convinced the Germans as a nation are far superior to other European peoples. It is quite all right for them to overrate themselves for without that they do not come to a true knowledge of themselves. "The Germans are always in danger of losing their nationality, because they have too little of this solid pride." (p. 10.) Treitschke's lectures are filled with words of scorn for the English, the French and the Italians. There is a "want of chivalry in the English character which strikes the simple fidelity of the German nature so forcibly." (Pol. II, p. 395.) The French are not reasonable and free enough in character. The Latin in general has no 'Gemuet'. He "has no feeling for the beauty of the forest; while he takes his repose in it, he lies on his stomach, while we rest on our backs." (Ibid., I, p. 206.)

Still worse off are the 'sub-German' peoples, such as the Russians, Poles, Czechs, etc. As compared with the Germans, who are

naturally cultured, they are semi-barbarians. Their only hope is that some day they may be conquered and thus share in the blessings of German culture.

On the lowest rung of the ladder are, of course the Jews. Though probably not quite as violent as anti-Semite as Hitler and Himmler, Treitschke has very little good to say about the Jews. For one thing they have become unnecessary now that the Aryans have themselves become accustomed to the management of money.

"Now all that is dangerous in this people becomes prominent, the decomposing power of a nation which assumes the mask of different nationalities. If nations had self-knowledge, even noble Jews would be obliged to confess that there is no room left nowadays for the cosmopolitanism of Judaism. . . . Judaism can only play a part if its members decide to become Germans. . . . That is a perfectly just and moderate demand So far I see only one means that we can employ here: real energy of our national pride, which must become a second nature with us, so that we involuntarily reject everything that is strange to the Germanic nature. . . . Where there is Jewish filth soiling our life the German must turn away, and he must accustom himself to speak the truth straight out." (Ibid., p. 60-61.)

But Treitschke also goes farther than that. Peter Viereck in his "Metapolitics" points out that "like Wagner, Treitschke accused Jews of importing into Germany the 'French ideas' of rationalism, legalism, and democracy," and that he made Judaism synonymous with the sordid, materialistic symbol of 'gold in the minds of millions of Germans." (p. 205.) From some of his later statements we see that Treitschke finally came to believe that the Jews were guilty of no less a crime than of "undermining the foundations of state,

church, and society." Thus he followed in the footsteps of Fichte and other Jew-baiters and aided in preparing the way for the anti-Semitism of our times.

From the fore-going it will have become abundantly clear that totalitarianism is inherent in every fiber of Treitschkean philosophy. But a moment's thought will reveal that such nationalism and the exaltation of the state of power quite naturally imply that the state is supreme in every respect and embraces the entire life of its subjects. And indeed Treitschke teaches this in so many words. He says: "The State protects and embraces the life of the people, regulating it in all directions." (p. 21.) (Italics our own.) There is absolutely nothing the state cannot do to maintain its power. It has unquestioned authority in every field of human endeavor.

"Theoretically no limit can be set to the functions of the state. . . . History shows us how the sphere of the state's activity increases with the growth of culture. . . . Experience teaches that the state is better fitted than any other corporate body to take charge of the well-being and civilizing of the people." (Politics, I, p. 74.)

Hence Treitschke demanded of the modern state "positive labor for the economic and intellectual welfare of its members." 'Economic and intellectual welfare' takes in a lot of territory. Though not a socialist he could think of no instance in which the state could not interfere in the economic field. And the same pertained to intellectual activity. The state must actively foster and guide the educational systems. Treitschke had no use for private or de-

nominal schools. Such schools tended toward division. Like Fichte and Hegel he insisted that state schools were the only ones to be permitted and all instructors were to be appointed and paid by the state. The home or the church could not be entrusted with this important duty. Treitschke even exults that the Reformation brought about such a large measure of secularization in the training of the youth. He says

"Briefly put, what was the great result of the Reformation? The secularization of great portions of the common life of men. When the state secularized the larger portion of the church's lands it also took over its accompanying public duties, and when we reckon how much the state has accomplished for the people's culture since the Reformation, we recognize that these duties fall within its natural sphere." (Politics, I, p. 75.)

And where, we ask once more does all this leave the individual? From the fore-going citations the answer is obvious. Treitschke subscribed wholeheartedly to the organic view of the state. To him the state was a whole to which the citizen must dedicate himself with every fiber of his being. The state was not to be looked upon as a means to an end but as an end in itself. It "must seek its own goal within itself," he says. (Ibid., I., p. 61.) For that reason

"no individual has the right to regard the state as a servant of his own aims, but is bound by moral duty and physical necessity to subordinate himself to it. Forgetting himself, the individual must only remember that he is a part of the whole and realize the unimportance of his own life compared with the common weal." (Ibid., I, p. 66.)

Treitschke, therefore, has only scorn and contempt for the doctrine of liberalism. That the state should be established for the purpose of guaranteeing our life and property seems ridiculous to him. "How comes it," he asks, "that the individual will sacrifice life and property to the state, if we simply look upon it as intended to secure life and property?" (Ibid., I, p. 15.)

"It is a false conclusion that wars are waged for the sake of material advantage. Modern wars are not fought for the sake of booty. Here the high moral ideal of national honor is a factor handed down from one generation to another enshrining something positively sacred, and compelling the individual to sacrifice himself to it." (Politics, p. 15.)

Treitschke tells us quite frankly that he does not believe in the sovereignty of the people. The idea that the general will of the people should be made operative in some way was abhorrent to him. True, he favored a national assembly which would have some voice in legislation, but he opposed having the members of an assembly elected by the people. Again like Fichte and Hegel he held it was "a sound principle to exclude the wholly irresponsible section of society from the exercise of a right which implies a capacity for independent judgment." Universal suffrage, he believed, gave a "disproportionate share of influence to stupidity, superstition, malice and mendacity, crude egoism and nebulous waves of sentiment." (Politics, I, p. 197.) Suffrages do not rest upon the will of the people Treitschke insists; they are "created against the will of the people; the state is the power of the stronger race which

established itself." (p. 39)

The only share that the individual has in the whole scheme of things is to obey. "Strict obedience is the first requisite," insists Treitschke. (p. 44.) "The state says: 'It is quite indifferent to me what you think about the matter, but you must obey.'" (p. 13.) "The terrible $\beta\acute{\alpha}\beta\acute{\alpha}\beta\acute{\alpha}\zeta\epsilon\alpha\alpha$ permeates the whole history of states." (p. 12.)

When Treitschke, therefore, speaks of political freedom he does not mean what is commonly understood by that term in democratic countries. Like all Hegelians he identifies it with duty. In the last analysis it, too, amounts to nothing more than the freedom to obey. This demand of absolute obedience is of course the logical outcome of the doctrine of power. Since the "essence of this great collective personality is power," it stands to reason that the individual citizen counts for something only in so far as he can contribute toward that power. He is a mere tool and instrument of the body politic. His individuality must be submerged so that the state might be strong.

In point of fact Treitschke cannot think of the members of the state other than as soldiers in an army. War is the national policy and military affairs are 'exalted above price', as we have seen. Hence "the army is the organized political strength of the state." (p. 104.) The military power is supreme in the nation

and it dominates the entire life of the citizenry. As the soldier cannot have a voice in the direction of military affairs but must render "unconditional obedience" (p. 104.), so it is with the individual in the state. He must "forget his own ego and feel himself a member of the whole; he must recognize what a nothing his life is in comparison with the general welfare. . . . The small man disappears entirely before the great thought of the state." (p. 23-24.)

And this renouncement of self goes so far that a man must sacrifice not only his life, but also "natural, profoundly justified feelings of the human soul; he must yield up his whole ego to a great patriotic idea; that is the moral exaltedness of war." (p. 104.) That amounts to saying that a person must really forget that he is human, that he must sell his very soul, so that the state might live and be strong.

That is deification of the state pure and simple. Though Treitschke's doctrine is not based upon an elaborate metaphysic as is Hegel's yet the implications are just as far-reaching. He, too, would subscribe to the dogma that there are no other gods above the state. He clearly teaches that the nation is the vessel of divine spirit. "The rays of the divine light, he says, "only appear in individual nations infinitely broken; each one exhibits a different conception of the divinity." (p. 10.) And again we are

told that national traditions as unfolded in the life of the state must be regarded as "the objectively revealed will of God."

It is quite in line with such reasoning to conclude that the state is supreme also in the field of morals and religion. If it is divine, then of course there can be no higher law to which it must submit. In discussing the relation of the state to the moral law, therefore Treitschke quite frankly praises Machiavelli. It was Machiavelli, he says, who first "set the state upon its own feet and freed it in its morality from the church; and also, above all, declared for the first time: 'The state is power.'" (p. 27.) True, the Italian went too far in some respects, says Treitschke, for he dragged the state "away from the moral law altogether," and in his doctrine of mere power he failed to realize, that the power acquired by the state "must justify itself by employing itself for the highest moral good and mankind." (p. 28.) However, a little closer scrutiny reveals that Treitschke is just as Machiavellian as Machiavelli himself. He places the state above everything else in the world and claims that the highest moral duty of the state is to maintain its power and that it is always its own arbiter when questions of right and wrong arise. The following paragraphs are very significant here:

"If we now apply this standard of a more profound and genuinely Christian morality to the state, and if we remember that the essence of this great collective personality is power, then

it is in that case the highest moral duty of the state to safeguard its power. The Christian duty of self-sacrifice for something higher has no existence whatever for the state, because there is nothing whatever beyond it in world-history." (Italics our own.)

"Thus it follows from this, that we must distinguish between public and private morality. . . . The order of rank of the various duties must necessarily be for the state, as it is power, quite other than for individual men. . . . To maintain itself counts for it always as the highest commandment; that is absolutely moral for it. And on that account we must declare that of all political sins that of weakness is the most reprehensible and the most contemptible; it is in politics the sin against the Holy Ghost." (p. 31 and 32) (Italics our own.)

This is stating the doctrine that 'might is right' and that the state is above all moral law in such crass terms that little remains to be said. The fact that Treitschke continues by claiming that the consequences of this truth are "that the state must only set moral aims before it, otherwise it would contradict itself," (p. 34.) means very little after he has given us his conception of morality. Even a dastardly act like tying human beings to the mouths of cannon and blowing their bodies to bits is justifiable, for "it behooves us to apply the standard of relativity to place as well as to time." (p. 37.)

In view of this attitude Treitschke would consider it impertinent if a mere individual would rise up and criticize the state. He maintains "that the private citizen has no right to resist the will of the state on the ground that such a resistance is based upon the voice of conscience or obedience to a higher law with greater

claims than the dictates of the state." (McGovern, From Luther to Hitler, p. 372.)

"The pure individualism of the natural law teaching came to the preposterous conclusion that the citizen has the right to desert the state if it declares a war which he holds to be unjust. But since his first duty is obedience such unfettered power cannot be granted to his individual conscience. For me the upholding of the mother country is a moral duty. The individual should feel himself a member of the state, and as such have the courage to take its errors upon him." (Politics, I, p. 104-105.) (*Italics our own*)

Under such circumstances it is to be expected that all religious expression is to be subjected to political control. At times, indeed, Treitschke appears to adopt a liberal attitude and seems to be in favor of religious freedom. There are passages in his writings which would indicate that he does not want to bind the conscience of the individual. Thus he says it would be "impolitic and unmoral if a state interfered with the religious life of its subjects." Yet a closer scrutiny reveals that the real Treitschke is not a liberal by any means.

For one thing he has a very low opinion about religion in general. It is something very relative, something that appeals to children and old people and the women folk, but hardly to the educated and the strong. Thus he says:

"Religious truths are truths of the mind, true as nothing else is for the believer, but altogether non-existent for the unbelieving. Childhood, which lives for the future and old age with its quiet contemplativeness are especially accessible to the promises of religion. To the female mind, also, the profound unrest of an existence without religion is unbearable. In the life of the state, however, it is above all men

who decide. . . . Religion wishes to know only what it believes, the state wishes to believe what it knows. . . ."
(Selections, p. 66 and 67.)

For that reason, "the aristocrat must use violence upon his accustomed views of life in order to come around to the view that we are all God's children. But this feeling will exist more strongly among more humble people." (l.c.)

In spite of this disparagement, however, Treitschke would make use of religion. He wants it taught in the schools. "From the standpoint of the State, atheists, strictly speaking, are an anomaly." (Politics, I, p. 334.) And again, "every father has the right to have his children instructed in the religious creed of his own choice, but he is not entitled to allow them to grow up without any religion at all." (Politics, I, p. 359.) Of course, all this instruction must be supervised by the state.

Treitschke's position is evidently this: Religion means a great deal to the common people. The state must, therefore, make use of it, for it is of value in making good citizens. Under no circumstances, however, is it permissible "for any one to make his religious convictions a reason for disobeying his law or neglecting his duty as a subject." (Politics, I, p. 334.) That simply means that also in religious matters every one must bow to the will of the state. Treitschke thoroughly disliked the old Catholic doctrine that the church was superior to the state, but had a like

aversion to the American idea that the church should be a purely voluntary organization, separate from the state. This separation implies that it is not to be controlled by the state, and this, to Treitschke's mind, would interfere with the supremacy of the state.

"The church received privileges as a corporation and is therefore to that extent brought into subjection to the state which supervises and decreases its legal status in civil society. . . . The education of the clergy is a matter which properly concerns the church, but the state must supervise it. . . . The state cannot afford to surrender its share in the patronage of the highest offices of the church."
(Politics, I, p. 351-355).

From these and similar passages it is clear that Treitschke came to the conclusion that the state could not really be tolerant in religious matters. Particularly is this true of him in the later part of his life. And this should not surprise us. It is the natural result of his glorification and deification of the state. It must never be forgotten totalitarianism has a religion all its own. The national state is its god. Treitschke seems to forget that he himself is actually propagating a pagan faith which is unalterably opposed to other religions, particularly the Christian. To him nothing is more sublime than 'Vaterlandsliebe' and the role of the Church is to be a handmaiden unto the state.

Viewing Treitschke's political philosophy as a whole, therefore, we find that it is thoroughly permeated with Fichtean and Hegelian doctrine. The one important difference is that it lacks the metaphysical background of the earlier thinkers. Being more realis-

tic and living in a practical age Treitschke extols power above all else. But as for his totalitarianism, it was just as pronounced as that of any other German thinker; and there can be no doubt that he was an important factor in spreading the ideology of the later Nazis.

We turn now to Nietzsche who, though in a different sense, was also an 'apostle of power'.

Friedrich Nietzsche
(1844 - 1900)

Nietzsche has often been called a rank individualist, and hence a discussion of his philosophy might seem out of place in this paper. However, he has been such a potent force in the totalitarian countries of the present day that his ideas must be dealt with when we are trying to trace the elements of totalitarianism in German thought. It is certainly not without significance that Mussolini frankly admits the strong influence which the writings of Nietzsche have had upon the formation of his own political opinions.

Nietzsche's biographer and apologist, A. M. Ludovici, says of his subject:

"Throughout his life and all his many recantations and revulsions of feeling, he remained faithful to one purpose and to one aim--the elevation of the type-man. However bewildered we may become beneath the hail of his epigrams, treating of every momentous question that has ever agitated the human mind, we still can trace this broad principle running through all his works: His desire to elevate man and to make him more worthy of humanity's great past." (Ludovici, p. 12.)

Nietzsche's worst enemy might agree with this estimate if 'ele-

vation' and 'worthiness' are to be understood in a Nietzschean sense. In other words the statement means very little unless we have first agreed upon a standard of values. This much, however, the words of Ludovici make clear, that Nietzsche was above all an ethical philosopher. He was concerned about morality, about understanding of what is meant by 'good' and 'bad'.

In his "Genealogy of Morals" Nietzsche tells us that already as a boy of thirteen the problem of the origin of evil haunted him. His first philosophical composition dealt with this question. A little later, he says, the problem changed into that other one: Under what circumstances and conditions did man invent the valuations 'good' and 'evil'? And what is their own specific value? A few years later, while writing a thesis on the subject "Theognis, the Aristocratic Poet of Megara" he was struck with the author's use of these terms 'good' and 'bad'. Theognis made them synonymous with aristocratic and plebeian or democratic. Everything that endangered the power of the aristocracy was bad and everything that enhanced it was good. This arbitrary use of these concepts, Nietzsche tells us, induced him to look upon morality in an altogether different light. Morality, it appeared to him, was a means of acquiring and maintaining power.

This idea he combined with the doctrine of evolution and believed he had a solution of his problem. Accordingly he denied

the existence of any moral code which was absolute and unchangeable and which might be known by an inner moral sense or discovered by reason. All ethical concepts developed according to time and place and the character of the people involved. Even nature proves this, says Nietzsche, Every species of animal adopts a mode of conduct which is designed to strengthen and preserve it, regardless of what this may mean to members of another species. Thus the lion's good is the antelope's evil. The lion is not concerned, and what is more, we should not expect him to be concerned, about what contributes to the welfare of the antelope or for that matter about animals in general. The only thing of value to him is what aids in the extension and the prevalence of his kind. And so it is with the thousands of other species. They either adopt the proper mode of behavior or succumb in the grand struggle for power.

Turning to man Nietzsche finds the same thing applies to him. He, too, adopts the kind of moral code that suits him. History proves that there have been all kinds of moral codes. What one people considers good, another denounces as bad and vice versa. Always, says Nietzsche, it will be found that a group adopts the code which tends to preserve it and strengthen its position. Hence it will tend to develop the type of human being representative of the group. Differently stated, the kind of morality prevalent at any given time will depend upon the character of people among whom

it comes into being. It will, therefore, tend to develop and multiply the type of human being representative of that group. "All moralities are but so many Trade Union banners flying above the heads of different classes of men, woven and upheld by them for their own needs and aspirations." (Ludovici, p. 32.) And Nietzsche says in his Zarathustra, which incidentally contains in poetic form his entire philosophy:

"If a people would maintain itself, it must not value as its neighbor doth. Much that one people called good another called scorn and dishonor. . . . Verily men have made for themselves all their good and evil. Verily, they did not take it, they did not find it, it did not come down as a voice from heaven. Values were only assigned unto things by men in order to maintain himself." (Zarathustra, p. 53 and 54.)

Thus "all moral valuations are in reality nothing but the expression of the needs of the particular community or herd, of that which is to its advantage. As the conditions for the maintenance of one community have been very different from those for the maintenance of another community ~~have been~~, there have been different codes of morality at different times and places. (McGovern, p. 411.)

Accordingly there must have been as many moral codes as there have peoples in the world. Nietzsche would admit this, but he tells us in "Beyond Good and Evil" that a careful study of the history of morals will show that 'of the finer and coarser moralities which have hitherto prevailed or still prevail on earth' certain traits

recur so regularly together, and are so closely connected with one another, that, one can readily put all of them into two classes. They are characterized by the type of men who have brought them into existence. We may conveniently call them master morality and slave morality. To the masters strength, power, heroism, health, awfulness, is the good. They are actuated by a desire to discharge a plenitude, a superabundance of spiritual and physical wealth. They are the heaven storming Titans. The other class are concerned about avoiding pain and unpleasantness. They desire peace and comfort and ease. Hence pity, good Samaritanism, patience, industry, and humility are of the highest value in their judgment. The first are like the oak tree which spreads out and reaches for the sun; the other are like the shrub which curses the oak because it is mightier and overshadows it. Misanthropists, pessimists, demagogues and foolish saints are the product of slave morality, while the master morality brings forth great artists, great statesmen, and great warriors.

With these ideas as a basis Nietzsche proceeds to examine the morality prevalent in the Europe of his time. He says there can be no doubt that it belongs in the class of slave morality. And if we ask how this has developed, our philosopher tells us that it is all due to the influence of Christianity. For 2000 years Christianity has taught man that he should be kind and good and

humble. It has lauded the meek and the lowly and the poor in spirit. It has gushed about an imaginary blessedness in an here-after and consigned all unbelievers to eternal torment. What kind of minds, says Nietzsche, would find such teachings palatable? Certainly not the strong, the heroic and the mighty of the world. No, the weak-kneed and the cowardly, those who are afraid, for it is through such morality that they can maintain and preserve their kind. Only a race of slaves can be the result. Therefore he denounces Christianity root and branch, and that with a venomance which is at times demoniac. Voltaire's cry écrasez l'infame (destroy the infamous thing) reechoes throughout his works. To him Christian values symbolized all that was stupid and mean and worthless. Hence he cries out:

"O my brethren! Where lies the greatest danger for the whole human future? Is it not with the good and the just?

"And whatever harm the wicked may do, the harm of the good is the most harmful harm!

"The creator they hate most,--him who breaketh tables and old values, the breaker. They call him a law-breaker (Verbrecher)." (Ibid., p. 205.)

"Oh, these good! Good men never speak the truth, for the spirit such being good is a sickness." (Ibid., p. 193.)

Nietzsche never tires of assuring us that God is dead and that all this talk of a divine code or a divine influence is so much trash. Even such well tried maxims as 'Thou shalt not steal! Thou shalt not kill!' are but the wimperings of the weaklings who are afraid of losing life and property.

'Thou shalt not rob!' 'Thou shalt not commit manslaughter!' Such words were once called holy; before them the folk bent their knees and heads and took off their shoes.

"But I ask you: Where in the world have there ever been better robbers and murderers than such holy words?

"Is there not in all life--robbing and manslaughter? And by calling such words holy, did they not murder truth itself?

"O my brethren, break, break the old tables!"

(Zarathustra, p. 155.)

The divine Christ is put down as an immature youth, overcome with a desire for death, one who had done better to stay in the desert.

"Too early died that Hebrew whom the preachers of slow death revere; and his dying-too-early hath been fatal to many since."

"As yet he knew only the tears and the melancholy of the Hebrews, together with the hatred of the good and just,--that Hebrew Jesus: then suddenly he was overcome with a longing for death.

"Believe me, my brethren! He died too early; he himself would have revoked his doctrine, had he reached my age! But he was still unripe." (Ibid., p. 67 - 68.)

All clergymen are denounced as poor deluded souls who are held in the bonds of 'falscher Werte und Wahn-Worte.' They ought to be 'redeemed' from their so-called 'Redeemer'.

In this strain Nietzsche rants against everything that has been considered holy for centuries. He sees as the inevitable result of Christian values nothing but degeneracy and decadence. It is Christianity, he declares, that is retarding the evolutionary progress.

This Christian slave morality might be good enough for the rabble who are really slaves at heart anyway. But real men ought

to denounce it and ascend to something higher. They should adopt the master morality and make their sole aim power and yet more power; for "the only true goods are strength of heart and strength of limb and power, and splendor. These we must love and cherish and seek to build up in ourselves and in the race. The strong must take what they can. The weak must go to the wall, and suffer they must." (Fuller History of Philosophy, p. 561.) Only in this way can a superior race be brought forth and mankind ascend to Superman. "Ich lehre euch den Uebermenschen!" That is the final refrain in all of Nietzsche's teaching. This 'Uebermensch' becomes to him the apex and the supreme goal of all values. He takes the place of God, is God himself. "Einst sagte man Gott, wenn man auf ferne Meere blickte: nun aber lehrete ich euch sage: Uebermensch." (Once we used to say God, when we looked out upon the distant seas; but now I teach you to say: Superman.) (Zarathustra, p. 77.)

From this view flows Nietzsche's whole conception of life. The chief and ultimate reality is not spirit or reason or God, but will. Therefore he says

"But thus willeth my creative will my doom. Or to put it more candidly: such a doom is just willed by my will.

"All that feeleth within me suffereth and is in prison; but my willing always approacheth me as my liberator and bringer of joy.

"Away from God and the Gods this will enticed me; What could one create if there were Gods.

"Willing delivereth: that is the true doctrine of will

and freedom--thus ye are taught by Zarathustra!" (Ibid., p. 79.)

But this will is not the will to exist and to survive, as Schopenhauer taught. It is the will to dominate and control, the will to power (der Wille zur Macht). This will is the deciding element in all phases of life. It is the divine spark, the ever driving element in the activities of all living things.

"Wherever I found living matter I found will unto power; and even in the will of the servant, I found the will to be master.

"Even thou, O perceiver, art but a path and foot step of my will. Verily, my will unto power walketh on the feet of thy will unto truth!

"Only where there is life, there is will; but not will unto life, but--thus I teach you--will unto power." (Ibid., p. 108 and 109.)

And in his "Antichrist" Nietzsche says:

"What is good?--All that increases the feeling of power, will to power, power itself in man.

"What is bad?--All that proceeds from weakness.

"What is happiness?--The feeling that power increases, that resistance is overcome.

"Not contentedness, but more power; not peace at any price, but warfare; not virtue, but capacity."

Life to Nietzsche was, therefore, not a striving to avoid pain and to attain happiness. Such teaching would again lead to softness, and degeneracy. No, life was the constant struggle for this surplus power. In "Beyond Good and Evil" he defines it as 'appropriation, injury, conquest of the strange and weak, suppression, severity, obtrusion of its own forms, incorporation, and, at least, putting it mildest, exploitation.'

Nietzsche calls this love of power 'the demon of mankind', but he is not thereby denouncing it. This conflict was to him what made life zestful and contributed to the elevation of man. Schopenhauer saw the same struggle and thought it horrible. For Nietzsche it was magnificent. He is thankful that he has enemies with whom he can engage in mortal combat. Even if one goes down in the struggle, that does not matter. "Also zu sterben ist das Beste; das Zweite aber ist: im Kampfe zu sterben und eine grosse Seele zu verschwenden." (Zarathustra, p. 66.) All this talk about seeking peace and comfort is evidence of low character. To struggle, to exert oneself, to overcome obstacles that is the thing. As Fuller puts it, it is this will to power that "gives us moral backbone. It inspires us to live dangerously. It gives us the guts to submit and suffer with gritted teeth, when and where we must." (Fuller, p. 561.)

Nietzsche feels that where these values obtain there will be real evolution and the elevation of mankind will result; for the cause of all evolution is just this will to power. The only moral law sanctioned by nature is that 'might is right'. Therefore Nietzsche calls out: 'Transvalue your values!' Make them noble, virile, masterly. "For it is values, values, and again values, that would men, and rear men, and create men; and ignoble values make ignoble men, and noble values make noblemen!" (Ludovici, p. 73.)

Nietzsche is sure some of these 'noble men' have already appeared. They are those strong characters who have left others behind and make great progress along the road to that higher goal. As a result they will often feel lonely, but this loneliness should not discourage them. They should be comforted by the fact that they can be instrumental in raising mankind to a higher level and thus aid in bringing forth super-man. "Awake and listen, ye lonely ones!" Nietzsche calls out. "From the future winds are coming with a gentle beating of wings, and there cometh a good message for fine ears. Ye lonely ones of today, ye who stand apart, ye shall one day be a people; from you who have chosen yourselves, a chosen people shall arise; and from it Super-man." (Zarathustra, p. 72.)

Whether the world envisaged by Nietzsche would be so much better than the present is, to say the least, very doubtful. Our philosopher forgets that there may be others who would disagree with him as to the meaning of greatness and of worth, and that, on very valid grounds. Then, too, it is pretty difficult to see how these great men, once they did appear, and particularly if they were great statesmen and warriors, could be kept from using every means to destroy each other, wreaking terrible havoc and destruction and thus setting mankind back instead of elevating it. However, we are not concerned here in evaluating Nietzsche's philosophy

as a whole, but rather in setting forth in what respect and to what extent his doctrine tends to be totalitarian. Let us look into this question.

In the first place it should be emphasized that Nietzsche does not glorify the state a la Fichte, Hegel, or Treitschke. In fact, he often denounces the state and speaks of it in the most disparaging terms. In "Zarathustra" he calls it 'das kalte Untier' (the cold monster) and 'der neue Goetze' (the new idol), which does nothing but lie and destroy.

"The state? What is that? Well, now open your ears, for now I deliver my sentence on the death of peoples.

"The state is called the coldest of all cold monsters. And coldly it lieth; and this lie creepeth out of its mouth; 'I, the state, am the people.'

"The state is a liar in all tongues of good and evil, whatever it saith, it lieth; whatever it hath, it hath stolen.

"Far too many are born; for the superfluous the state was invented." (Zarathustra, p. 43-44.)

And in the "Götterdaemmerung" Nietzsche points out that there is always a conflict between the political power and the cultural activities of a people. "Culture and the state," he says are antagonists,--let no one be deceived about this. The one lives on the other. All great periods of culture are periods of political decline. Whatever is great in a cultural sense is non-political, is even anti-political." (Quoted in Rucker, "Nationalism and Culture," p. 83.)

It must be admitted, then, that Nietzsche is not a thorough-

going totalitarian who, like so many others, wishes the state to have supreme power in all things. He insisted too often on the free scope of the individual will, which also might oppose the state. And yet there are many features of his political philosophy which are^{so} acceptable to totalitarians that many of his ideas have been taken over by them and made a part of their doctrine; and Nietzsche is still one of the most popular writers among them.

One of these features, in fact the most important one, is just Nietzsche's doctrine of power. As we have seen, all totalitarians glorify power. Now there is nothing on this earth more powerful than the state. According to Hobbes it is 'the great Leviathan', the all-devouring. And even Nietzsche, as already mentioned, calls it 'das grosse Untier'. He seems to forget, however, that the chief characteristic of the 'Untier' is its super-human power. His 'Ueberschensch' would be very stupid indeed, if he failed to make use of this instrument of power. What is more, in the front ranks of Nietzsche's masters we find just the great statesmen and military leaders. He wants these to be rulers and lords, for he says: "The highest man shall also be the highest lord on earth. There is no harder lot in all human fate than when the powerful of the earth are not at the same time the first men. There everything becometh false and warped and monstrous." (Zarathustra, p. 236.)

But if Nietzsche insists upon this, then it is entirely inconsistent for him to deprecate the state. To laud the statesman because he has power and then denounce that which makes this power possible is not very logical to say the least. Nietzsche evidently failed to realize that worship of power inevitable leads to a worship of the powerful state. We might add that the opposite also holds true. It can be readily understood, therefore, why totalitarians were quick to seize upon this Nietzschean doctrine and give it their hearty assent.

And closely allied with the power idea is the notion that war is glorious. This we must expect for the simple reason that nothing is such a test of strength as warfare, and nothing enhances the power of a nation more than to be victorious in military combat. We should, therefore, expect the apostle of power and struggle to extol war, and that is just what he does. "War and courage," Nietzsche tells us, "have done more great things than charity. . . . Every natural gift must develop itself by contest. . . . One will have to forgive my occasionally chanting a paean of war. Horribly clangs its silvery bow, and although it comes along like the night, war is nevertheless Apollo, the true divinity for consecrating and purifying the state. . . . War produces an ethical impulse indicative of a much higher destiny. . . . We rejoice in everything which like ourselves loves danger, war, adventure." And in

"Zarathustra" we find our philosopher counseling his followers in this way:

"You I do not advise to work, but to fight. I do not advise you to conclude peace, but to conquer. Let your work be a fight, your peace a victory!

"Ye say, a good cause will hallow even war? I say unto you: a good war halloweth every cause. (Z., p. 42.)

"Man shall be brought up for war, and woman for the recreation of the warrior. Everything else is folly." (Ibid., p. 60.)

Peace, according to Nietzsche, is an unnatural condition.

Real men long for battle. They look upon every peace as a preparation for the next war. "Ye shall love peace as a means to new wars," says Zarathustra, "and the short peace better than the long one." (Ibid., p. 42.) Surely no totalitarian has ever 'chanted the paean of war' in clearer tones than Nietzsche. He sees in war nothing but a phase in that universal struggle of the will to power. And is it not of more than passing significance that we find the Fuehrer of the Third Reich speaking in the very same strains? Says he

"Nature knows no political boundaries. She places the living being on this earth and then watches the free play of power. The strongest in courage and persistence, as her favorite child, is awarded the right to be master of existence. . . . So-called humanity is an expression of a mixture of stupidity, cowardice, and assumed smartness. In the eternal combat mankind has become great--in eternal peace it sinks into ruin." (Mein Kampf, p. 147-148.)

A further element so dear to the heart of all totalitarians is Nietzsche's denunciation of democracy. He will hear nothing of popular sovereignty and truly libertarian ideas. Again and

again he heaps opprobrium upon the common people. They are to him a conglomerate mass who should receive no consideration. It nauseates him to think that these people should have power and perhaps even rule. He says

"The common herd is a mish-mash. Therein is all mixed up with all, saint and rogue and gentleman and Jew and every animal from Noah's ark." (Z. p. 235.)

"Whatever is of the womanish tribe, whatever is of the slaves' tribe, and especially the mish-mash of the mob--these now will to be come the masters of all human fate. Oh, loathing, loathing, loathing!" (Zarathustra, p. 279.)

Nietzsche's hatred of democracy stems from the feeling that it makes possible the control by the low, the mean, and the base to the detriment of the elite. It is also, according to him, directly contrary to the principle of evolution; for evolution means the survival of the fittest, while democracy means control of the fittest by this 'Poebel-Mischmasch'. For a like reason Nietzsche has no use for the doctrine of utilitarian liberals, who maintain that the aim of all government should be 'the greatest good to the greatest number'. He believes that governments should seek to develop the elite of society. If need be the masses should be sacrificed for the benefit of the strong men.--That is what would constitute real progress. "The sufferings and toils of humanity are necessary in order to permit the existence of a few creators, supreme masters of the destinies of mankind, sublime Olympian artists who constitute the justification of humanity. The progress of civiliza-

tion has not for its aim the emancipation of the masses. The real interests of civilization demand the existence of a vast confused mass of humanity which shall serve as the instrument whereby the race of the elite, of the masters may be cultivated." (G. Chatterton-Hill, "The Philosophy of Nietzsche", p. 207.) (Quoted in McGovern, p. 413.)

According to Nietzsche, then, the state does not exist for the purpose of furthering the happiness of the people, but rather to aid in producing the master race. Hence he favors a strict caste system, after the manner of the patricians in Rome, or the "aristoi" in Athens. An aristocracy, he believes, is absolutely necessary if there is to be progress. "Every elevation of the human type has until now been the work of the aristocratic society--and this will it always be--the work of a society which believes in the necessity of the hierarchy of rank and values, and which necessarily has slavery in some form or another." (Ibid., p. 413.) This can only mean that the average man has no other duty than to obey those who are above him. He exists for their sake. All of this would not be quite so bad if Nietzsche's 'elite' were men, great in intellectual ability and great in character; but that is not the case. His 'race of elite' are those who have power. And everyone knows that history is full of examples of men who were cunning enough to gain superior power, but who belonged to the very dregs of humanity.

Thus it must be plain, that Nietzsche, in spite of his constant

reiteration of the freedom of the will, is not actually a friend of the individual. This becomes still clearer when we note what he conceives the role of the individual to be. Nietzsche insists time and again that a human being exists that he 'might be overcome'. He is not an end but a means. His role purpose is to be of some value in the grand process of realizing the Superman. Accordingly we hear Zarathustra saying:

"I teach you Super-man. Man is something that shall be surpassed.

"Man is a cord, connecting animal and Super-man, a rope over a precipice.

"What is great in man is that he is a bridge and not a goal; what can be loved in man is that he is a transition and a destruction." (Zarathustra, p. 6 and 8.)

If the average man is but a 'bridge' or a 'cord' or mere 'Uebergang' and 'Untergang', then of course he cannot have individual worth. Indeed, Nietzsche does not want his masters to think of individual worth. They should be ferocious, and cruel and hard when it comes to handling these slaves. If they show pity and consideration that is already a sign of weakness. Master morality is concerned only with the welfare of the masters and the enhancement of their power.

It is not difficult to see how nicely all this fits into the system of totalitarian thought. All glorifiers of the national state agree that the individual as such does not really count, that he is a mere tool who may be used in any way the rulers might see

fit to attain a larger goal. They also agree that the master-concept is quite acceptable to them; and they applaud very enthusiastically when they hear Nietzsche call out: "Oh blessed remote time, when a people said unto itself: 'I will be--master of peoples.'" (Zarathustra, p. 203.) They merely add: We are those masters. In other words, it is not a far cry from Nietzsche's 'race of masters' to Hitler's 'master race'.

Of even greater significance is the fact that Nietzsche's doctrine of the relative value of all moral codes is thoroughly acceptable to the propagandists of the all-embracing state. As we have seen, Nietzsche holds that any moral code is the product of a group or community and is an expression of what that group or community considers to be to its own advantage. If we substitute 'state' for 'group' or 'community' we are talking in totalitarian terms. True, Nietzsche insists the better morality is that of the masters. He wants only that one kind, all others being worthless. But again, totalitarians make no objection. They apply that to themselves and say: Our code is the code of the masters. We are the higher race, the 'Herrenvolk', and hence everything is right and good which tends to enhance our power and welfare.

And finally, a similar situation obtains with regard to the religious views of Nietzsche. In two important respects his religion and that of the totalitarians agree. In the first place

both are decidedly and fundamentally anti-Christian. If there is any difference it is this that Nietzsche is more honest and outspoken in his opposition. He bluntly says the Christian influence is perverse and must be swept aside entirely. Most totalitarians are more subtle, particularly those in Germany. In his "National Socialism and the Catholic Church" Dr. Miklem of Oxford points out that "Herr Hitler has not infrequently expressed himself in appreciation and genial terms as the protector and friend of the Christian Churches." (P. 3.) And, indeed, the official Nazi program states very definitely: "We demand freedom for all religious sects in the state. . . . The party as such represents the point of view of a positive Christianity." (Art. XXIV.) But all that means only that the fight against the church is not out in the open. Fundamentally the line between the totalitarian 'Weltanschauung' and the Christian view of life is just as sharp and just as permanent as between Nietzscheanism and Christianity. Both are the direct antithesis of historical Christian values and so pagan to the core that not even a compromise is possible.

In the second place Nietzsche's position on religion is like that of the totalitarians in that both are worldly religions; that is to say, they deny a universally supreme being to whom everyone everywhere and at all times is accountable. With one the ultimate reality is the Super-state, with the other the Super-man. Both

are of the earth, earthly. Totalitarians do not want their followers to 'seek first the kingdom of God'. As we have seen they are worshippers of the state. Their kingdom is on this earth and is the glory of the nation. Nietzsche's attitude is similar. It would be wrong to say that he is irreligious, but if there is one thing he insists upon is this, that the masters must renounce all thought of a higher being. They must keep their feet on the ground, as it were, and never let their thought soar to a nebulous world beyond. Zarathustra, speaking in a voice that is 'transfigured' (verwandelt) implores his disciples:

"Remain true to the earth, my brethren, with the might of your virtue! Your ever-giving love and your intelligence should serve the earthly mind. Thus I implore and adjure you.

"Let these not fly away from the earthly and beat their wings against everlasting walls. Lead the virtue which has flown away back to the earth as I do." (Zarathustra, p. 61.)

Thus many ideas in the philosophy of this supreme egoist readily appeal to the totalitarian mind. And Nietzsche's doctrines found wide-spread acceptance and had a profound influence upon political thought. Dr. J. MacEachran of Alberta University is authority for the statement that numerous Nietzsche-Clubs were formed, particularly at the centers of learning in Germany. The youth was attracted to these organizations in large numbers and became fanatical followers of Nietzsche. Intoxicated with his ideas of power they were ready to throw overboard all traditional values

and worship at the shrine of the goddess of Power. Whether he was aware of it or not, therefore, Nietzsche played an important role in preparing Germany for totalitarianism. He was in a very real sense a precursor of the later Nazi ideologists.

Conclusion

Fichte, Hegel, Treitschke, Nietzsche,--these are, then, without doubt the four names that loom large on the horizon of totalitarian thought in Germany. It is almost impossible to overestimate their influence. As one studies the writings of other political philosophers among the Germans one is struck by the fact that there is hardly anything new and original, though there is a shift of emphasis. Whether it be Goerres, Bluntschil, Spengler, Bernhardt, or even the poet-musician Wagner,--all have reiterated the thoughts and sentiments of these four men.

Again and again we meet with the doctrine that the state is a vessel of divinity absolutely supreme in the life of man; that it has organic existence and is therefore an end in itself; that there are in the 'Volk' collectivity some super-natural and unconscious forces; that in the evolutionary process of history material power is all-important and war a divine agency of progress; that the Germans are a superior people destined to save civilization by imposing their will upon the world; that national interests are supreme and that the sublimest thoughts and aspirations of man culminate in 'Vaterlandsliebe'. And this continues right on down to Huston Chamberlain, Goebbels, Rosenberg and Hitler himself. The Fuehrer is no Moses with a new gospel. As a matter of fact there is not one original idea in the whole of "Mein Kampf". True, the

Nazi doctrines appear in new guises and bear new names; but what are 'Blut und Boden', 'Gemeinnutz vor Eigennutz', 'deutsches Christentum', 'Fuehrerprinzip', 'Volksseele', 'Rassenkampf', 'Herrenvolk', etc., etc., but echoes of Fichte and Hegel and Treitschke and Nietzsche!

However, these philosophers did not influence political writers only. Their doctrines also gradually seeped down to the masses. Indeed, it is not too much to say that the German people were nurtured for a century on spiritual fare supplied by these men. When therefore Hitler and his fellow-demagogues, who understood mob psychology and the value of pageantry, preached the totalitarian doctrines with the fervor of prophets, literally millions were found gullible enough to accept the 'new' Weltanschauung as true and make it their own. With the dynamic impetus given it by the Nazis totalitarianism has become a mass movement in Germany and racial and nationalistic megalomania reign supreme.

All of this brings home to us with telling force the truth that ideas play a vitally important role in the affairs of men. Some may deny this, but it is true; for, as Peter Viereck says: "Ideas are exciting, exciting because they can move men to deeds and move nations to make history." (Metapolitics, p. IX.)

The objection has been raised that the Nazi leaders do not believe these ideas, that they are cynic opportunists who are try-

ing to maintain their power in their own interests. Even if this were true, it would not do away with the fact that the German people are sincere in their belief in totalitarian doctrine. This is particularly the case with the youth. One need only observe the behavior of young German prisoners to learn what kind of spirit dwells in their hearts. Their constant 'heiling' of Hitler is a bold proclamation of their Nazi faith. They have become fanatical adherents of the doctrine of 'Deutschland ueber alles' and are willing to die in the defense of it.

And what is of equal significance, cynics or no, Hitler and his satellites have and are making successful use of these ideas. For whether we take the destruction of all personal freedom, the persecution of the church, the rape of neighboring countries, the extermination of the Jews, or that ruthless waging of a war for world domination,--all are but the carrying out a program based upon totalitarian ideas. 'As a man thinketh, so he is', and we might add, so he acts. The words and beliefs of the Nazis have born practical fruit. Similarly, the 'new order', which Hitler has promised the people of Europe, finds its justification in the principles laid down in his writings.

It is ^{therefore} of the utmost importance at this time that we realize this, for if we are to arrive at a proper understanding of the world-wide struggle in which we are now engaged we must see in it

a clash of ideas as well as of arms. As Prime Minister King puts it, "the storms of human passions which have swept the oceans of the world, and arrayed nations, continents and hemispheres alike, in conflict the one against the other" are due "to two wholly different interpretations of life, and of the purpose of life."

(Address to the 'Pilgrims of the United States', p. 11.) This war is a battle between two worlds of thought, and in that sense a crusade as some are wont to call it. Even the dictators agree with us on this point, for Mussolini's famous "We or they!" is a direct challenge to all who think differently. He is saying that there is not room for both upon the earth at the same time. It is not going to far, therefore, to say that the 'Weltanschauung' with which we have dealt and which is now backed by the military and economic efficiency of the Germans and their Axis partners, constitutes the gravest menace the free peoples of the world have ever faced.

We should not forget that our civilization is based upon the heritages of rationalism, liberalism, and Christianity. Totalitarianism is the absolute negation of all of these. It is for brute force as against reason, for authoritarianism as against freedom, for a tribal paganism as against the Christian view of the worth of the individual soul and the universal brotherhood of man. For that reason a victory of the Axis powers would involve much more

than the re-drawing of national boundaries or the shifting of sovereignty. It would mean the destruction of our whole way of life. The only true freedom,--moral and spiritual--could not exist in a totalitarian world. To quote the Prime Minister once more, "The Nazi purpose is to destroy every belief, and to subvert every institution which, from childhood's days, men and women of the free countries of the world have been taught to reverence. Their aim is the total destruction of Christian civilization." (Radio address, "The Real Issue in the War", p. 4.)

In view of this it must be plain that there can be no thought of a compromise peace to end the war. It is well that our leaders see this. In his recent message to the Congress of the United States President Roosevelt pointed out that the enemy must be brought to "abandon the philosophy which has brought suffering to the world." The same thought was emphasized after the historic meeting at Casa Blanca. Certainly everyone, who understands the situation, will agree that unless this purpose is attained, unless the millions who are now carried away by false promises, can be convinced that the social traumas as preached by the spiritual descendants of Fichte and Hegel and Treitschke and Nietzsche are inherently false and outrage the dignity of man, the peace after this war will be but another armistice in which the nations will soon find themselves girding for another struggle more horrible

than the last.

At the same time we should not think that the accomplishment of this task is going to be easy. The youth in the totalitarian countries have been saturated for years with this false ideology. They are so steeped in extreme racialism and nationalism that a military triumph of our armies alone will not be sufficient. We must battle the enemy also in the field of ideas. That means that education and enlightened propaganda must play a large role in all post-war attempts at reconstruction.

Because of this it becomes urgently necessary for all friends of liberty and the democratic way of life to study the totalitarian creed in all seriousness and become thoroughly acquainted with the momentous issues involved.

Nor should the objection be raised that this study is of secondary importance in such a time of action as 1943, for as a matter of fact these ideas, though often dealt with theoretically, are just as "urgently important and as urgently dangerous as any concrete action reported in the daily headlines." How true this is we see from a recent boast of Dr. Joseph Goebbels, who says: "The aims of National Socialism are being achieved one after another. The world is only surprised at our attitude because it does not know us." We must know them, we must see clearly what their aims and aspirations are. But in order to do that we must have a thorough understanding of their fundamental philosophy which is the

well-bpring of their actions. Only then will we be able to take counter measures; only then can our program of education and propaganda be effective.

However, there is another reason why we should study and fully recognize the implication of totalitarianism. Not all the danger is from the side of the Axis enemy. For one thing there is Russia. The Russians are fighting with us; but every student of politics knows that communistic ideology is decidedly anti-libertarian and anti-Christian; and all the praise that is being heaped upon the 'gallant ally' at the present time doesn't change this fact.

In the second place, danger threatens us also from within. There is no point in lulling ourselves into a false security. We all know that the power and the influence of the state also in the democracies has been expanding for years. Ever wider areas of human life are coming under its domination. Education, health, housing, transport, employment are just some of the elements which are increasingly affected, or directed, by the state. And there is no guarantee that this trend will not continue, particularly after the war. It is entirely possible that also a democratic state may gradually drift into some form of totalitarianism. As the Bishop of Chichester points out

"The citizen of a democratic state may be deprived of his freedom, by the subtle influence of the universal provision of social services, from ante-natal clinics to eushania couches, just as effectively as the German subject is

robbed of his liberty by the system of spies and concentration camps. The youth of a democratic state may be moulded on a pattern, and given a particular philosophy, by a so-called democratic education, just as truly as Hitler Youth is moulded on the Hitler pattern, and given a Rosenberg Weltanschauung." (Christianity and World Order, p. 6.)

Thus the danger is real that the state becomes not merely a conspicuous factor in the social existence of man but so overwhelmingly dominant as to imperil and even destroy man's freedom. True, the forces at work in a democracy would be different and the state might continue to call itself humanitarian, democratic, and pacific, but it could "make the same universal claims as the totalitarian state. . . .and be equally unwilling to tolerate any division of spiritual allegiance." (Dawson, Religion and the Modern State, p. 54.) Proponents of liberalism must, therefore, be alert and see to it that the trend toward state control be halted in time, for at bottom the problem is the same. It really matters very little, if we lose our freedom, whether this be through the despotism of a dictator or the despotism of a collectivized state.

With this we do not wish to give the impression that we favor ultra-conservatism and urge a return to pre-war conditions. Our democracy must be dynamic enough to cope with modern problems as they arise and demonstrate its ability to work toward a better world. If the state can be of service in this respect and can aid in attaining a larger measure of human welfare and social security,

then by all means we should use it; but it must not be permitted to become all-embracing. The growth of individuality--that is, uniqueness and freedom of initiative, so far as this is compatible with the general social good,--must be guaranteed to everyone. There must always be room for the development of that wide range of human activities which are non-political. Associations such as churches, clubs, foundations, universities and the like, must be permitted relative freedom from interference on the part of the state. In short, the state must always be a means to an end, it must remain man's servant and never become his all-powerful master. To put it in the words of R. B. Perry: "It behooves us to avoid a superstitious veneration of the state, and to reaffirm the traditional view that government is an instrument which is justified only by the benefits which it confers on the individual men and women who live under it." (Philosophic Roots of Totalitarianism, p. 31.)

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